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Compliments of 

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, 

84 State Street, Boston, Mass. 



THE CRISIS OF FOREIGN 
INTERVENTION 

IN THE 

WAR OF SECESSION 

./ 
1862 



i 

'id* 



\ 



THE 
CRISIS OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION 

IN THE 

WAR OF SECESSION 

SEPTEMBER-NOVEMBER, 1862 



BY 

CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS 



B OSTON 
1914 






[The following paper, prepared for the Massachusetts Historical 
Society, and submitted at its April Meeting, 1914, appears in the 
printed Proceedings of that Society, vol. xlvii, pp. 372-424.] 






THE CRISIS OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION 
IN THE WAR OF SECESSION, 1862 



At the November meeting, 191 1 — thirty months since — 
it may by some be remembered I submitted a paper — "The 
Trent Affair; An Historical Retrospect" — which now appears 
in its proper place in our Proceedings. The episode then dis- 
cussed was one of indisputable historical interest, and I was 
able to speak of it to a certain extent from personal recol- 
lection. What I now submit amounts to a sequel. I then had 
occasion to refer in some detail to the Confederate Commis- 
sioners arrested in transit by Capt. Wilkes — James M. Mason 
of Virginia, and John SlideU of Louisiana. I described their 
seizure, their subsequent detention at Fort Warren, their re- 
lease, and, finally, their arrival at their original destinations 
in the two European capitals — London and Paris — there to 
represent the Confederacy. 

The present narrative has in it not a few of the elements 
which enter into works of fiction; and, on behalf of the Confed- 
eracy, it was John Slidell who at that juncture arranged the 
diplomatic program about to be described. Such being the 
case, it is historically interesting, in view of what subse- 
quently occurred, to recall the impression once made on his 
contemporaries by Mr. Slidell; for, so highly developed was 
his faculty of political management supposed to be, he was 
popularly regarded as Httle short of a magician. This impres- 
sion was shared also by those exceptionally competent to form 
opinions on that head. For instance, in his publication, 
My Diary, North and South, W. H. Russell thus describes a 
social call at New Orleans, May 24, 1861, immediately after 
the fall of Fort Sumter. He says: 

In the evening I visited Mr. Slidell, whom I found at home with 
his family. ... I rarely met a man whose features have a greater 
finesse and firmness of purpose than Mr. Slidell's; his keen grey 



eye is full of life, his thin, firmly-set lips indicate resolution and 
passion. Mr. Slidell, though born in a Northern state, is perhaps 
one of the most determined disunionists in the Southern Confeder- 
acy; he is not a speaker of note, nor a ready stump orator, nor an 
able writer; but he is an excellent judge of mankind, adroit, perse- 
vering, and subtle, full of device, and fond of intrigue; one of those 
men, who, unknown almost to the outer w^orld, organizes and sus- 
tains a faction, and exalts it into the position of a party — what is 
called here a "wire-puller." Mr. Slidell is to the South something 
greater than Mr. Thurlow Weed has been to his party in the North. 
. . . Mr. Slidell and the members of his family possess naivete, good 
sense, and agreeable manners; and the regrets I heard expressed 
in Washington society, at their absence, had every justification. 

This was written in May. Six months later Mr. Slidell 
emerged into world-wide notoriety, and Russell, then still 
sending his ''Special Correspondent" letters to the Times, 
thus referred to him immediately after the Trent affair, the 
letter, written in Washington, appearing in the Times issue 
for December loth: 

Mr. Slidell, whom I had the pleasure of meetiDjgr in New Orleans, 
is a man of more tact and he is not inferior to his colleague, Mr. 
Mason, in other respects. He far excels him in subtlety and depth, 
and is one of the most consummate masters of political manoeuvre 
in the States. He is what is here called a ''wire-puller," — a man 
who unseen moves the puppets on the public stage as he lists — a 
man of iron will and strong passions, who loves the excitement of 
combinations, . . . and who in his dungeon [at Fort Warren], or 
whatever else it may be, would conspire with the mice against the 
cat sooner than not conspire at all. . . . Originally a northern man, 
he has thrown himself into the southern cause and staked his great 
fortune on the issue without hesitation, and with all the force of his 
intellect and character. 

Commenting on the above, I thus expressed myself in the 
paper on the Trent affair: 

Slidell, on the other hand, was considered one of the most astute 
and dangerous of all Confederate public characters. An intriguer 
by nature, unscrupulous in his political methods, he . . . was 
generally looked upon as the most dangerous person to the Union 
the Confederacy could select for diplomatic work in Europe. The 
first object of the envoys was to secure the recognition of the Con- 
federacy.^ ^ 
* Proceedings, xlv. 40. 



In the present study my purpose is to describe, in the light 
of material to which access has since been obtained, the work 
done by this master of poHtical management, this diplomatic 
magician, during the eight months immediately succeeding 
his arrival in Europe. The narrative, an extraordinary one, 
involves, as I shall show, the crisis of our Civil War. Well- 
designed, the scheme — plot, it cannot properly be termed — at 
one time seemed almost certain to prove a triumph of dip- 
lomatic art. In the event it failed, and failed utterly; but its 
failure was due to a combination of circumstances highly 
iihprobable of occurrence, and quite beyond the control of 
Mr. Slidell. Not long surviving the cause he had furthered, 
Mr. Slidell died in exile. No biography of him has since 
been published, and his papers, like those of his colleague in 
the Senate and Chief in the Confederate State Department 
during the Civil War, Judah P. Benjamin, have been de- 
stroyed. In his share in what then occurred, however, so far 
as the record survives, I find nothing provocative of censure, 
nothing which an opponent would be justified in stigmatiz- 
ing as otherwis*e than in accordance with the accepted rules 
of the game. On this point my judgment is also worth 
something; as, first so to do, I have been privileged to read 
the confidential correspondence between him and Mr. Mason. 

July, 1863, witnessed the Gettysburg struggle and the fall 
of Vicksburg. That month, consequently, is by general his- 
torical consent looked upon as marking the climax and turning- 
point of the War of Secession. Perhaps it did; but it may none 
the less fairly be questioned whether for sympathisers in the 
cause of the Union, the previous September did not furnish 
occasion for a deeper soHcitude. In it the crisis became acute; 
and, until the ensuing July, it continued to be so. 

To summarize briefly the course of events, it will be re- 
membered that in August, 1862, the great Union advance 
inaugurated, East and West, in the preceding February, had 
spent its force*; and, in Virginia, ceasing to be aggressive, it 
was thrown back to such an extent that Washington, and not 
Richmond, stood jn danger of hostile occupation. At the same 
time, the European situation was far from satisfactory. 
Not only was the Confederate cotton campaign in progress, 
but every indication favored for it "an early and successful 



issue; and that issue involved nothing less than the out- 
come of the struggle. Was Cotton not indeed King? This 
had, in the summer of 1862, become a world question; and 
the machinery and life incident to and dependent upon the 
cotton production and the cotton textile industries, whether 
in Great Britain, on the continent, or in Asia, were disor- 
ganized. The social unrest and economical suffering, neces- 
sarily incirient to a commercial confusion literally world-wide, 
were at their height. This condition of affairs was, moreover, 
by common consent, attributed to the American War. The 
blockade of the Southern cotton-shipping ports by the National 
Government of the United States was accepted as the obvious 
cause of ills and disturbances in Hindustan and China no less 
than in Lancashire. 

The question of foreign action in some form, bearing on 
this situation — whether an offer of mediation, or through the 
formal recognition of the Confederacy as a member of the 
family of nations, or through a refusal farther to recognize 
the blockade — now presented itself. It had been in the air 
since the commencement of the struggle. Indeed, weeks be- 
fore the attack on Fort Sumter, M. Mercier, the French 
Minister in Washington, had become so convinced that a 
permanent separation, South from North, was impending and 
inevitable, that he had even gone so far as to suggest to Lord 
Lyons that it was desirable that he, the British Minister at 
Washington, acting in connection with the representative of 
France, should be clothed with discretionary power to recog- 
nize the Confederacy. This was in March. ^ The conviction 
further on assumed in Mercier 's mind the shape almost of an 
obsession;^ and, naturally, it colored his official dispatches, 
operating immediately on the minds of the Emperor and his 
advisers in potent furtherance of the program which had 
early outhned itself in Mr. Slidell's busily scheming brain. 
Indeed, that program may be said to have originated with the 
French representative; for, in April, 1862, Mercier obtained a 
permit to visit the Confederate capital. Judah P. Benjamin 
was then acting as the Confederate Secretary of State, and with 
him, Creole Senator from Louisiana up to the previous Feb- 
ruary, the French Minister had, during their common resi- 

1 Newton, Life of Lord Lyons, i. 34. 2 /^^ g^ 



dence in Washington, held social relations of a peculiarly 
friendly character. Lord Newton, in his Life of Lord Lyons, 
says of Mercier in this connection, ''after the manner of French 
diplomatists of the period, he could not resist the temptation 
of trying to effect a striking coupr ^ Whether such was or 
was not his moving impulse, Mercier had concealed from Lord 
Lyons his project until it was too late to endeavor to dis- 
suade him from it. Indeed, he was bent upon it. More 
cautious in his disposition than his colleague, Lord Lyons ap- 
prehended that in going to the Confederate capital at that 
time he was "as likely to get himself into a scrape as to do 
anything else." And it so turned out. It was an officious 
act, characteristic of the man and of the imperial diplomatic 
service. 

Mercier got back on the 24th of April.^ He returned 
more than ever persuaded that a restoration of the Union 
was impossible; ^ that unless the Powers of Europe intervened 
the war would last for years; that in the end the independence 
of the South would have to be recognized; that the evils inci- 
dent to a cotton shortage would meanwhile be intensified; 
and that, in view of these conditions, the Governments of 
Europe should be on the watch for any favorable opportunity 
of exerting themselves in such a way as to end the war. His 
dispatches would in this connection be of great historic value; 
and, at some future time, will probably be accessible. At 
present, however, they are buried in the archives of the French 
Foreign Office; but the Minister of course freely communicated 
his views whether to the Emperor personally or to his official 
superior in the department of the French Foreign Affairs. 
Those views also, it so chanced, chimed in most opportunely 
with the plans of the Emperor in connection with the Mexican 
enterprise on which he was at the time fully embarked. Na- 
poleon III, therefore, was under every inducement to exert 
himself actively and openly to bring the proposed intervention 
about.4 A Httle later, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
M. Thouvenel, was in England, and the Emperor then sent 

1 Newton, Life of Lord Lyons, i. 82; Lyons to Russell, April 14, 1862. 

2 Lyons to Russell, April 25, 1862. 

3 See Butler, Judah P. Benjamin, 288. 
^ Rhodes, iv. 94. 



8 



him a telegram desiring him unofficially to ascertain whether 
the British Government did not think the time had com.e for 
recognizing the South. This was in July. Thouvenel replied 
that from conversations which had already taken place be- 
tween him and Lord Palmerston, and from the language 
which the Premier had just used in Parhament, it did not 
seem to him expedient to press the matter further at that 
time.^ 

The course of ensuing events must next be noted in close 
connection with military operations then going on both in 
the United States and in Mexico. The reverses to the Union 
arms which marked the months of July, August and early 
September, 1862, were already foreshadowed. On the i8th 
of July, it was reported in London and Liverpool that 
McClellan 's army either had surrendered or was on the point 
of capitulation.^ Under pressure of disaster, a military reor- 
ganization in face of a victorious opponent had become a 
necessity. So General Halleck, called from the West to Wash- 
ington, superseded at the seat of government McClellan, his 
senior in commission. General Pope had already been put 
at the head of a newly organized force, intended to act in co- 
operation with the Army of the Potomac, but wholly indepen- 
dent of it. The succession of military disasters was thus 
provoked, which, a few weeks later, resulted in the Union 
forces being driven or withdrawn from Virginia soil. On the 
29th of July, moreover, to the unconcealed satisfaction of 
Parliament as well as a large preponderance of the EngKsh press, 
the Alabama, eluding the customs officials, got to sea. It was 
in position to begin its work, the character of which was well 
and generally understood. A British-built, British-armed and 
British-manned Confederate commerce-destroyer had been let 
loose on the American merchant marine. 

The second French expeditionary force to Mexico was in 
course of active preparation. The Emperor had been advised 
by the commander of the first force, sent out a year before, that 
in point of discipline, organization and morale, the French were 
so superior to the Mexicans that he (Gen. Lorencez) felt able 
to "assure the Emperor that at the head of six thousand men 

1 Walpole, Twenty-five Years, 11. 55. 

2 Adams, Ms. Diary; Mason to Slidell, July 18, 1862. 



[he] would undertake to become complete master of Mexico." 
Thus officially informed, Louis Napoleon, constitutionally a 
dreamer, was imbued with a belief that it was his mission to 
establish in West Indian waters a firm government, which 
"shall give to that Latin race beyond the ocean its ancient 
strength and power. " ^ 

From Gibraltar to Kronstadt, all Europe was intently fol- 
lowing the above course of events. Thus, through a wholly 
fortuitous concurrence of circumstances, Mr. Slidell found 
himself in that situation for which Nature had especially de- 
signed him. The atmosphere was one of intrigue, and every 
condition of the environment, whether in France, in England, 
in Mexico, or in the Confederacy, invited manipulation. 
He was also in fairly close personal touch with the Emperor, 
at that time looked upon as the European Sphinx, and him- 
self the busiest schemer of the day. About the middle of 
April the Confederate Commissioner had with him a personal 
interview, of which Slidell sent to Mason the following 
account: 

My interview lasted seventy minutes (one hour, ten minutes) ; he 
was particularly gracious, I may even say cordial. I had expected 
him to be reserved, taking little part in conversation, making or 
suggesting questions and replying briefly. Far from this he talked 
freely, frankly, and unreservedly, spoke in the most decided terms 
of his sympathy and his regret that England had not shared his 
views. He said that he had made a great mistake in respecting a 
blockade which had for six months at least not been effective, that we 
ought to have been recognized last summer while our ports were still 
in our own possession. He spoke freely of the Mexican question and 
the probability of its soon bringing him into collision with the United 
States, that the treaty with Mexico if ratified by the Senate, would 
place them inevitably in a hostile position towards him. He asked 
if he offered mediation how the question of boundaries could be 
settled? What we would insist on? I said that we would insist on 
all the States where a majority of the people had already deter- 
mined by their votes to join our Confederacy, leaving the people 
of Kentucky, Missouri and Maryland to decide further — such as 
whether they could or would associate their fortunes with ours. 
He expressed his regret that he had not been able sooner to see me 
and on parting said that he hoped for the future I should have less 
difficulty in seeing him. 

* Martin, Maximilian in Mexico, 107, 108. 



lO 

On the whole he left on my mind the impression that if England 
long persists in her inaction he would be disposed to act without 
her, although of course he did not commit himself to do so. He 
said that he had reason not to be wholly satisfied with England, 
she had not appreciated as she should have done his support in the 
Trent affair. There is an important part of our conversation that 
I will give you through Mr. Mann. On the whole my interview was 
highly satisfactory.^ 

At this time a sharp personal stimulus was administered to 
Mr. Slidell's activities. The surrender of New Orleans to the 
Union fleet under command of Admiral Farragut took place 
April 26. Immediately on receipt of the news of this event 
in Paris, Slidell wrote to Mason that in an interview with 
M. Thouvenel, the Foreign Secretary, he had frankly admitted 
that this occurrence ''would be most disastrous, as it would 
give the enemy the control of the Mississippi and its tribu- 
taries, that it would not in any way modify the fixed purpose 
of our people to carry on the war even to an extermination. 
He [Thouvenel] said that was the opinion of everyone here. " ^ 
Referring to the effect of the capture on his personal circum- 
stances, Slidell added in the same letter: " The taking of 
New Orleans cuts me off from all resources while the war 
lasts, and that will probably be very many months. Under 
other circumstances, I should not care about receiving any- 
thing from Richmond. This, is now to me a matter of 
consequence."^ 

Slidell's line of diplomatic activity was now clearly defined. 
Aware that concurrent action with Great Britain was funda- 
mental in the policy of the Second Empire, Slidell's pur- 
pose was to make the most effective use possible of France 
• to influence Great Britain in favor of a joint European 
recognition of the Confederacy, and, if possible, of inter- 
vention in the blockade. This failing, he further hoped so 
to commit Napoleon through his Mexican enterprise that, 
in case of a failure to bring about concurrent action, the 
independent recognition of the Confederacy by France would 
become for the Emperor a logical necessity, implying the 

1 Slidell to Mason, April 20, 1862. 

2 Slidell to Masojt, May 19, 1862. 
2 Slidell to Masoti, May 14, 1862. 



II 

presence of a formidable fleet in the waters of the Gulf, 
*' strong enough to keep [that coast] clear of every Federal 
cruiser." Such a naval armament had in fact already been 
provided as a necessary adjunct to the Mexican outfit. As 
Slidell now expressed it to Mason, ^'I shall be very much sur- 
prised and disappointed if the Emperor do not take the 
matter in hand on his own hook." This was written Au- 
gust 3. Three days later, on the 6th, Slidell further wrote 
to the same effect. Referring to a discussion which occurred 
in the House of Lords two days previous, in the course of which 
Earl Russell, being questioned, had made certain statements, 
Slidell thus expressed himself: 

I think that it may now be assumed that England will not move, 
and I can only account for the inaction of the English Ministry on 
the hypothesis that they desire to see the North entirely exhausted 
and broken down, that they are wiUing in order to attain this 
object to suffer their own people to starve, and [themselves to] play 
the poltroon in the face of Europe. [Russell's] answer must have 
been given without any consultation with this Government. If I 
am right in this opinion, the Emperor has been treated with a 
rudeness approaching to indignity, which will make him the better 
disposed to pursue his own pohcy without consulting England. 
If he do, Russell's prompt reply ought not to be regretted. France 
will for us be a safer ally than England. 

With this program rapidly assuming shape in his mind, on 
July 1 7 Slidell had submitted to the Emperor a direct and defi- 
nite proposition, which was also a little later communicated in 
writing to Thouvenel, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This 
proposition was based on formal instructions drawn up by Ben- 
jamin, the Confederate Secretary of State, at the time of 
Mercier's visit to Richmond. Benjamin's instructions ran 
in part as follows: 

It is well understood that there exists at present a temporary 
embarrassment in the finances of France, which might have the 
effect of deterring that government from initiating a policy likely 
to superinduce the necessity for naval expeditions. If, under these 
circumstances, you should after cautious inquiry be able to satisfy 
yourself that the grant of a subsidy for defraying the expenses of 
such expeditions would sufl&ce for removing any obstacle to an ar- 



12 

rangement or understanding with the Emperor, you are at liberty 
to enter into engagements to that effect.^ 

Slidell, accordingly, construing his instructions broadly, 
now proposed to Louis Napoleon that, in return for Confederate 
recognition, France was to receive in bales of cotton w^hat 
amounted to the equivalent in cash of a hundred million francs, 
together with most favorable tariff arrangements; and, so far 
as Mexico was concerned, an immediate alliance offensive and 
defensive was to be arranged. ^ Tliis was in every way an op- 
portune as well as tempting inducement; and the Emperor 
encouraged the Confederate representative by assuring him 
that he, the Emperor, had moved in the matter, and was ex- 
erting himself to bring about combined action by European 
powers. A diplomatic intimation meanwhile shortly after 
reached Mr. Slidell to the effect that it was undesirable the 
special inducements held forth should come to the knowledge 
of the English Government;^ and, accordingly, when Slidell 
confidentially communicated with his London colleague on 
this topic, he did not fail to intimate to him that the ex- 
istence of an understanding so markedly advantageous to 
the French Government had best not reach those the Em- 
peror proposed to have associated with him in the con- 
templated movement. It was presumably at this stage of 
proceedings that the telegraphic message from the Emperor 
personally to Thouvenel, already referred to, was sent. 

Thus Slidell was putting in most effective diplomatic work, 
and the tide not only seemed to be setting, but, from all di- 
rections, actually was setting in favor of the Confederacy, and 
that strongly. On the 7th of August ParHament was pro- 
rogued, and the Government, relieved of its presence for some 
months to come, felt comparatively free. The situation in 
Lancashire was, however, most disturbing. It even threat- 
ened to get beyond all available means of relief, and not im- 
possibly of control. The market was in a condition of unpre- 
cedented excitement, for American cotton was quoted at thirty 
pence per pound, while great uneasiness was felt because of a 
belief that the next steamer from America might not improb- 

^ April 12, 1862. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, 11. 229. 
2 Slidell to Benjamin, July 25, 1862. 
' Slidell to Mason, July 30, 1862. 



13 

ably bring news of the Confederates being in Washington. 
In such case, as the result of some European offer of mediation, 
a speedy recognition of the Confederacy was anticipated, and 
Liverpool might find itself flooded with cotton arrivals. The 
most prudent and the most daring were equally at a loss. The 
suffering in the Lancashire districts was at the same time 
rapidly intensifying. The number of those either actually 
paupers or dependent upon others for relief was mounting up 
at the rate of approximately a thousand each day; and it was 
reported that as compared with the previous year there had 
been an increase of over 113,000 persons in receipt of parochial 
relief, or some 263 per cent. In five manufacturing centres, 
32,718 operatives were reported as working short time, while 
33,651 were wholly unemployed; 14,530 only were working 
full time. The weekly loss of wages in those five unions alone 
amounted to £27,430.^ 

In view of these facts and the situation thus set forth, the 
minds of both Lord Palmerston and Earl Russell naturally a 
little later on turned to the question of policy as respects the 
American conflict. Was not the time actually come, or at 
least probably at hand, when a new attitude should be assumed? 
If so, what form should it take? Should the cooperation of 
other European powers be invited? And, so far as France was 
concerned, the intimations, direct and indirect, semi-official 
and unofficial, received first through Mr. Lindsay and later 
through M. Thouvenel, bore fruit. ^ As Palmerston expressed 
it, '^France, we know, is quite ready, and only waiting for our 
concurrence." ^ So far as the cause of Confederacy was con- 
cerned, all the indications were favorable. 

Lord Palmerston accordingly now broached the subject in 
characteristic fashion to Earl Russell; and the two, as the 
result of an interchange of views, agreed on both the expedi- 
ency and nature of ministerial action looking, as respects the 
American conflict, to a radical change of policy. This sub- 
ject, however, elsewhere discussed,^ is familiar history, and I 

1 Index, I. 354. 

2 Slidell to Mason, August 6, 1862; Butler's Benjamin, 299. 

3 Walpole's Russell, 11. 362, 

* Life of C. F. Adams (Am. Statesmen Series), chap, xv; Studies, Military 
and Diplomatic, 400-412; Trans- Atlantic Historical Solidarity, 97-106. See, also, 
Rhodes, iv, and, generally, the researches of Callahan, Latan6 and others. 



14 

have no new facts now to present in connection therewith. 
I shall not, therefore, encumber our Proceedings with what 
would at best be only a useless repetition. At this juncture 
Lord Palmerston was at Broadlands, his home in the South 
of England. Earl Russell was at Gotha, Germany, in attend- 
ance on the Queen, who had left England in the closing 
days of August. She, recently widowed, was in a state of 
great mental depression. When not absorbed in a sense of 
bereavement, her mind was occupied with family and strictly 
domestic affairs; for the marriage of the Prince of Wales, now 
arranged, took place some months later. 

The proposed change of policy, based on a tender of 
friendly mediation to the parties to the American conflict, 
decided on by the two ministers had been officially com- 
municated to the Queen, and she had assented thereto. In do- 
ing so she had merely expressed a wish that Austria, Prussia 
and Russia should be consulted before action was taken. 
It was, however, well understood that the counsels of no one 
carried greater weight in the mind of the Queen than those of 
King Leopold of Belgium; and King Leopold was at this time 
writing personal letters to the Emperor urging him to use 
every exertion to cause England to join in a recognition of the 
Confederacy, or take any other course likely to put an end to 
the American struggle. The Confederate agents naturally set 
much store on the influence thus brought to bear in their 
favor. ^ As Mason expressed it to Slidell, "You know, I sup- 
pose, the great and affectionate respect of Queen Victoria for 
her uncle." So it only remained to bring the matter before 
the Cabinet for its approval; and that approval seems to have 
been assumed as of course. The importance of the action 
proposed was fully realized, and, in order to give proper at- 
tention to it, the Foreign Secretary now left Gotha, return- 
ing to England and his Downing Street office. Getting there 
about the 2 2d of September, the next two weeks were utilized 
by him in the preparation of an elaborate Cabinet circular, 
in furtherance of the program agreed upon between himself 
and the Premier. He was reUeved as respects attendance on 
the Queen by Lord Granville, then President of the Council. 
In the confidential circular he now drew up the Foreign Secre- 

* Slidell to Mason, October 29; Mason to Slidell, October 31, 1862. 



IS 

.tary submitted to his colleagues the question whether, in the 
light of what had taken place in America and the conditions 
of distress prevailing throughout the manufacturing districts 
of England and France, it was not the duty of Europe ''to 
ask both parties, in the most friendly and conciHatory terms, 
to agree to a suspension of arms for the purpose of weighing 
calmly the advantages of peace" — and so forth and so on. 

Harmless, and even philanthropic and benevolent, in aspect 
and tone, this was in fact a most insidious, not to say hypo- 
critical, proposition; for it was an initial step — the entering 
wedge. The national government, it was perfectly well known, 
would reject the offer. If, then, the Confederacy signified its 
acceptance — what was the next step to be? Of course, rec- 
ognition; to be speedily followed by a joint intervention, Eng- 
lish and French, at least to the extent of a refusal to recognize 
further the blockade. Europe was to the last degree benev- 
olent; but it wanted cotton, and proposed to get it. Lord 
Palmerston and Earl Russell knew just as well what the game 
they were playing meant, as did James M. Mason and John 
Slidell, when they put the Emperor up to playing it. Mean- 
while, this attitude and style of utterance were in no way char- 
acteristic of either Palmerston or Russell — the somewhat 
cynical bonhommie of the one or the curt downrightness of 
the other. But it is always to be remembered that John Bull 
was then, in contemplation of our most unfraternal strife, 
indulging in one of his most unctuous, Pharisaic moods. Hap- 
pily forgetful of Burgos incidents, in his Peninsular Wars, and 
of more recent Hindoo, Sepoy-suppression methods, he could 
not find words adequate to the expression of the horror felt 
over the unchristian, not to say ungentlemanly, way in which 
we were conducting ourselves and hostihties in America. 
''History afforded no example," etc., etc., etc. Snivelling and 
with upturned eyes, Russell and Westbury now recorded their 
sense of the "horrible atrocities" which marked the course of 
a war which "may become worse than any we have yet heard 
of in barbarism and atrocity." The Chadband, I am-better- 
than-thou, element in the British make-up was unmistakably 
and, to Americans, most unpleasantly in evidence. On the 
other hand, the calm and self-contained Lyons was at this time 
absent from his post and temporarily in England, having left 



i6 

in charge of the legation at Washington a Mr. Stuart, "a 
strong partizan of the South." And Mr. Stuart, as the record 
shows, vied with Mercier in his obsessions as respects media- 
tion and recognition. A most unhappy substitute for Lyons, 
this gentleman was now advising the Foreign Secretary and 
Cabinet that the general aspect of things in America was, as 
the result of the mihtary reverses then sustained by the Union 
Army in Virginia, fast ripening for mediation and peace. There 
were, in short, more hopeful indications of returning sense; 
and he was almost convinced that any proposals which Great 
Britain might now make in concert with France, if moderately 
and courteously worded, would, after a certain amount of 
threats and howling by the violent portion of the press, be favor- 
ably received by a majority of the public. And so, expressing 
himself in harmony with such suggestions direct from the scene 
of conflict, the Foreign Secretary oiled his entering wedge with 
language most moderate and courteous. Altogether, it was, 
for John Russell, quite a model of Pharisaic unctuosity. 

Next to Lord Palmerston and Earl Russell, Mr. Gladstone 
was the most influential member of the ministry then in office. 
Consulted as to the change of policy proposed, he gave to it 
his emphatic approval. It wholly coincided with the views he 
at that -time entertained. The cry of distress coming up from 
the cotton-spinning districts appealed to his strong humani- 
tarian sympathies. He, moreover, like Lord Palmerston, and 
indeed the great mass of European observers and supposed 
authorities, was fully convinced that a re-estabhshment of the 
American Union was impossible, as well as from every point 
of view undesirable. Finally, by a subtle process of reasoning 
always characteristic of him and them, Mr. Gladstone, in 
common with a large number of his countrymen, had most 
conveniently persuaded himself that the immediate victory 
of the slave-owner would surely result in the ultimate downfall 
of slavery. He had also conceived an idea that the Northern 
States could be reconciled to the severance of the South by 
the friendly acquisition of the Canadas and the other British 
North American continental possessions; to which arrange- 
ment, as Mr. Gladstone was then inchned to think, no sound 
objection existed. More than thirty years later, reverting in a 
spirit of unsparing self-examination to what now occurred, he 



17 

wrote: "I really, though most strangely, believed that it was 
an act of friendliness to all America [to cause the North] to 
recognize that the struggle was virtually at an end." ^ 

The concurrence of Mr. Gladston\3 in the proposed program 
apparently made the assurance of its adoption doubly sure; 
for, as Lord Granville had a few months before, and in another 
connection, written to Lord Canning, *'He [Gladstone], Johnny 
[Russell], and Pam [Palmers ton] are a formidable phalanx when 
they are united in opposition to the whole Cabinet in foreign 
matters." Not only was this so, but in the present case, so far 
as sympathy with the struggling and now apparently victori- 
ous Confederacy was concerned, a large majority of the Cab- 
inet were with ^^the formidable phalanx." So Granville, an 
experienced judge of Cabinet situations, looking upon the 
conclusion as foregone, wrote to a colleague, *'I suspect you 
will settle" in the way proposed; "it appears to me a great 
mistake." ^ 

For weeks the tension had been on the steady increase. 
Something of a decisive character must, it would seem, soon 
occur; and, on each side, the representatives of the contending 
parties were preparing for an immediately impending crisis. 
Mr. W. S. Lindsay, member of Parliament representing Sun- 
derland, was throughout the conflict a warm English' sup- 
porter of the Confederate cause. His personal relations with 
the Confederate commissioners were so close as to be al- 
most intimate. He in June brought forward a motion that 
in the opinion of the House of Commons the time had come 
when '^the propriety of offering mediation with a view to 
terminating hostilities between the contending parties [in 
America] is worthy of the serious and immediate attention of 
Her Majesty's Government." After consulting with Disraeli, 
Roebuck, and other leading Conservatives and Liberals, as 
well as with Mason and SHdell, Mr. Lindsay had in July 
concluded that conditions were ripe for pressing his motion.^ 
Thouvenel, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, was then 
in London.'* Why was he there? Slidell, writing at this junc- 
ture from Paris, assured Mason, as the result of a "long, 
interesting and satisfactory interview with the Emperor" 

1 Morley, Gladstone, ii. 8i. ^ Fitzmaurice, GrawwV/e, i. 442. 

* Masonio Slidell, July 11, 1862. < Ih., July 13, 1862. 



i8 

that '^ things are right in France." He further told Mason 
that he had received the Emperor's approval of a formal 
demand for immediate recognition, to be simultaneously made 
by himself in France and by Mason in England.^ Mason 
in reply wrote: "I am happy to say that the rout before Rich- 
mond has had the happiest effect here in all quarters, and things 
look well for Lindsay's motion tonight." He added: ''We have 
rumors today coming through the bankers that McClellan's 
army had capitulated, he escaping in a gun-boat." ^ 

The debate on the motion took place on the evening of the 
1 8th. Concerning it Mr. Lindsay had a month before written 
as follows to Mr. Mason: ''Lord Russell sent to me last night 
to get the words of my motion. I have sent them to him 
tonight, and I have embraced the opportunity of opening my 
mind to his Lordship. I have told him that I have postponed 
my motion in courtesy to him — that the sympathy of nine- 
tenths of the members of the House was in favor of immediate 
recognition, and that even if the Government was not pre- 
pared to accept my motion, a majority of votes would be 
obtained within the next fortnight." He added: "I further 
told his Lordship that recognition was a right which no one 
would deny us the form of exercising. That the fear of war 
if we exercised it was a delusion. That the majority of the 
leading men in the Northern States would thank us for exer- 
cising it, and that even Seward himself might be glad to see 
it exercised so as to give him an excuse for getting out of the 
terrible war into which he had dragged his people." ^ The 
debate ^ closed with a speech from the Premier, after which, 
at his suggestion the motion was withdrawn. Of what Palm- 
erston said on this occasion Mr. Adams the next day wrote: 
"It was cautious and wise, but enough could be gathered from 
it to show that mischief to us in some shape will only be averted 
by the favor of Divine Providence on our own efforts. The 
anxiety attending my responsibiHty is only postponed." A 
few days later Mr. Adams further wrote: "The suspense is 
becoming more and more painful. I do not think since the 
beginning of the war I have felt so profoundly anxious for the 

1 Slidell to Mason, July i6, 1S62. 2 Mason to Slidell, July 18, 1862. 

^ Lindsay to Mason, June 18, 1862. 

^ Index, I. 214; 3 Hansard, clxviii. 549. 



19 

safety of the country." Then, on the 29th of September: 
^'For a fortnight my mind has been running so strongly on 
this, night and day, that it seems almost to threaten my 
life/' 

In view of the emergency possibly impending, Mr. Adams 
had weeks before written home asking from Secretary Seward 
specific instructions for his guidance if what he apprehended 
should occur. Those instructions he had in due time re- 
ceived; they were expKcit. They were also characteristic. 
The despatch in which they were imbedded, prolix and Seward- 
esque, is also otherwise curiously suggestive. Suffice it to say 
that, in its essential passages, carrying the standard entrusted 
to him high and with a firm hand, the American Secretary 
in that hour of darkness, defeat and discouragement bore 
himself in a way in which his country may take pride. Fifty 
years later the concentrated excerpts read well. The despatch 
was in part^as follows: 

If the British government shall in any way approach you directly 
or indirectly with propositions which assume or contemplate an ap- 
peal to the President on the subject of our internal affairs, whether 
it seem to imply a purpose to dictate, or to mediate, or to advise, 
or even to solicit or persuade, you will answer that you are forbid- 
den to debate, to hear, or in any way receive, entertain, or transmit 
any communication of the kind. You will make the same answer 
whether the proposition comes from the British government alone 
or from that government in combination with any other Power. 

If you are asked an opinion what reception the President would 
give to such a proposition, if made here, you will reply that you are 
not instructed, but you have no reason for supposing that it would 
be entertained. 

If contrary to our expectations the British government, either 
alone or in combination with any other government, should acknowl- 
edge the insurgents, while you are remaining without instructions 
from this Government concerning that event, you will immedi- 
ately suspend the exercise of your functions. ... I have now in 
behalf of the United States, and by the authority of their chief 
executive magistrate, performed an important duty. Its possible 
consequences have been weighed, and its solemnity is therefore felt 
and freely acknowledged. This duty has brought us to meet and 
confront the danger of a war with Great Britain and other states 
allied with the insurgents who are in arms for the overthrow of 



20 

the American Union. You will perceive that we have approached 
the contemplation of that crisis with the caution which great reluc- 
tance has inspired. But I trust that you will also have perceived 
that the crisis has not appalled us.^ 

With these ringing instructions before him, Mr. Adams now 
awaited the outcome he was powerless in any material way 
to affect. Meanwhile, acting under a proper sense of diplo- 
matic restraint, he did what was in his power to do. He 
communicated the tenor of his instructions to W. E. Forster, 
a member of Parliament and stanch friend of the Union, who 
held confidential relations with Mr. Milner-Gibson, a member 
of the Cabinet. Mr. Forster expressed the opinion that the 
Government should be made aware of the nature of these in- 
structions before it further committed itself; but what action, 
if any, he took to that end does not appear. It is, however, in 
no way an unreasonable historical assumption to suppose that 
the intimation thus given reached its intended Cabinet destina- 
tion. If so, it could not have failed to convey to the minds 
of those responsible for the pohcy about to be pursued its 
ultimate possible consequence in the matter of American 
Alabamas. Both Lord Palmerston and Earl Russell also 
retained vivid personal recollections of 1812. 

The special Cabinet meeting was called for the 23d of Oc- 
tober; to all outward appearance and in all human probabiHty 
that was the fateful day; the ordeal must then be faced. The 
course of events was arranged. As it rested in the mind of the 
Foreign Secretary, it began with an innocent-looking proposal 
of a cessation of hostihties; friendly offices in the way of media- 
tion were next to be extended; with a recognition of the 
Confederacy in reserve, should this offer be decHned. So far 
as the American minister was concerned and the course by 
him to be pursued in the contingency now arising, the in- 
structions of the Secretary were exphcit. They covered the 
ground. 

The momentous 23d of October came and passed. Upon it, 

^ So far as is ascertainable never made public in full, the body of this despatch 
of August 2, 1862, is to be found in Messages and Documents, 1862-1863, Part 
I, 165-168. The passages quoted were there omitted, and were first printed as 
from Ms. by Rhodes (IV. 342-343) in 1899, and by Frederic Bancroft in his Seward 
(II. 294-296) in 1900. 



21 



SO far as the outer world was advised, nothing happened. 
The unexpected had again occurred. 

What had taken place? Why was the carefully prepared 
program, so far-reaching, so world-momentous, suddenly, 
quietly, postponed — ostensibly abandoned? It is a curious 
story — that which I am now about to tell. But I must 
preface it with an acknowledgment — an acknowledgment 
amounting almost to a recantation. Not pleasant to make, 
it none the less illustrates somewhat strikingly, I think, the 
force, in historical narrative as v/ell as in political and re- 
ligious discussion, of Cromwell's famous remark to the Presby- 
terian ministers in Edinburgh Castle: "I beseech you, brethren, 
to think it possible that you may be wrong." I in this case 
confess to having heretofore been wrong — to having reached 
erroneous conclusions. Not only did I misinterpret the course 
of events, but I attributed motives to individuals which I have 
since seen cause to believe did not influence them, or, in any 
event did not influence them to the extent I assumed. 

Following such authorities as were then accessible, and draw- 
ing from them inferences inherently probable, if not mani- 
festly logical deductions, I attributed what now occurred to an 
indiscretion on the part of one member of the EngHsh Cabi- 
net. Through that indiscretion he put himself in the pov/er, 
so to speak, of a chief who felt no good- will towards him. The 
offending Cabinet member was Mr. Gladstone; the chief was 
the Premier, Lord Palmerston. It was, as I saw it, a Cabinet 
collision between tv/o very eminent pubKc characters, in which 
one availed himself of an opportunity to assert his authority 
and to secure an advantage over the other. In what now en- 
sued I stated that ''the hand of the Premier was on the poKti- 
cal lever," and that he had in the outcome caused a somewhat 
forthputting subordinate to realize that he was not yet master. 
To this Cabinet controversy I attributed a fortunate delay of 
action on an issue of international policy which, occurring at 
a most critical period, led to far-reaching results. 

In arriving at this conclusion, moreover, as I have said, I 
merely made use of the material at my disposal, relying upon 
the evidence of those who, it might naturally be assumed, were 
best and most correctly informed. 

In the Hght of new material contained in recent publications, 



22 



and more especially from information derived from unpublished 
English sources, access to which has recently been given me, I 
now find myself compelled to the conclusion that I was mis- 
taken in both my statements and my inferences; that, in short, 
the causes to which I attributed important poHtical action in 
no way, or only in very slight degree, affected it or the course 
of events. 

There was, I am now satisfied, no collision at this time be- 
tween the Premier, Lord Palmer ston, and the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, Mr. Gladstone. The utterances of Mr. Glad- 
stone were, it is true, most indiscreet and politically ''incon- 
venient;" but I am satisfied the Premier took no offence at 
them, and that the relations between the two throughout the 
time in question were, if not actually friendly, yet courteous 
and thoroughly considerate. Thus the historical situation I 
at Oxford somewhat dramatically pictured has since, so to 
speak, gone to pieces on my hands. So to-day and here, I 
propose to set forth the facts as I now find they really were, 
substituting for what I have heretofore said explanatory of the 
mystery a more commonplace, but certainly, I must admit, 
a more natural as well as satisfactory solution. It has the 
advantage, too, of being historically correct. 

I will now proceed to state what actually did occur; though, 
in so doing, I upset not only the inferences to be drawn from 
my predecessors in the line of narrative, but also the conclu- 
sions and statements of other members of my own family di- 
rectly at the time concerned, who naturally would be assumed 
to have been pecuharly well informed. 

This acknowledgment of error duly made, I return to the 
narrative — my revised explanation of the British Cabinet 
mystery of October, 1862. It was, it will be remembered — 
for dates in this connection are all-important — the 23d of 
October that had been assigned for the special Cabinet meet- 
ing to consider the change of policy proposed. Now it so 
chanced that sixteen days before, on the 7th of that month, 
Mr. Gladstone delivered himself of that famous Newcastle 
speech, still remembered, in which he declared that Jefferson 
Davis had ''made a nation," and that the independence of the 
Confederacy and dissolution of the American Union were as cer- 
tain "as any event yet future and contingent could be." That 



23 

speech, a marvel of indiscretion — or, as Mr. Gladstone him- 
self subsequently expressed it, "a mistake of incredible gross- 
ness" — though at the moment it caused in the mind of 
Mr. Adams a feeling akin to dismay, in reahty went far 
towards working a favorable solution of the problem which 
so deeply concerned him. At a very critical moment com- 
pKcating a delicate Cabinet situation, it prematurely preci- 
pitated action. 

Speaking for himself — ^'playing off his own bat," as Lord 
Palmerston would have expressed it — Mr. Gladstone had 
foreshadowed a ministerial policy. The utterance was in- 
spired; in venturing on it Mr. Gladstone unquestionably sup- 
posed, as he had good cause to know, he spoke the minds of 
both Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell. In fact, writing to 
him in his familiar way two weeks before the Newcastle occa- 
sion, Lord Palmerston had thus outlined the proposed change 
of policy: 

It seems to Russell and me that the time is fast approaching when 
some joint offer of mediation by England, France, and Russia if 
they would be a party to it, might be made with some prospect 
of success to the combatants in North America, and Russell is going 
to instruct Cowley by a private letter to sound the French Govern- 
ment as to their willingness to agree to such a measure if formally 
proposed to them. Of course, no actual step to such effect could 
be taken without the sanction of the Cabinet. But if I am not mis- 
taken, you would be inclined to approve such a course. 

The Proposal would naturally be made to both North and South, 
and if both accepted we should recommend an armistice and cessa- 
tion of Blockades with a view to negotiations on the basis of separa- 
tion. If both declined we must of course leave them to go on; 
if the South accepted and the North declined we should then, I 
conceive, acknowledge the Independence of the South. But we 
ought, Russell and I imagine, to declare the maintenance of our 
neutrality even in the case of our acknowledging the Independence 
of the South. Ld. Lyons would be going back towards the middle 
of October, and his Return would be the fitting opportunity for 
such a step if determined upon. It looks as if matters were rapidly 
coming to a Crisis and perhaps we may have to make the move 
earlier than the middle of October. A great battle appeared by the 
last accounts to be coming on. If Maclellan is badly defeated the 
Federal Cause will be manifestly hopeless, if Jackson should sustain 
a serious reverse he will be in a dangerous Position so far North 



24 

and cut off from his supplies. But a few days will bring us impor- 
tant accounts. 

Palmerston then added the following significant intimation, 
bearing more particularly upon the topics on which the Chan- 
cellor of the Exchequer would presumably dwell: 

I saw the other day that you are going to have some great dinner 
given you in the early part of next month. I hope the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer will not be too sympathizing with the Tax Payer, 
nor tell the Country that they are paying too much taxation, have 
too large Establishments, and ought to agitate to bring the House 
of Commons and the Government to more economical ways and 
habits. These topics suit best Cobden and Bright and their fol- 
lowers. 

The principle of the so-called "collectivity" of the British 
Cabinet has been often discussed, and the rule is well estab- 
lished that ministers are in no wise free to put forward each 
"his own views at large public meetings and elsewhere." As 
Lord Palmerston a few days later wrote to Clarendon, refer- 
ring to Gladstone's Newcastle speech: "A minister, whether 
speaking in or out of Parhament, ought to confine his remarks 
to the past and the present, and to steer clear of the future, 
unless he is authorized to announce the result of some Cabi- 
net decision." ^ Now, in this case, no Cabinet decision had 
been reached; nor, if it had been reached, would the pubKc 
announcement of it have been committed to the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer. It would have fallen within the province 
of either the Foreign Secretary or the Premier. As it was, a 
premature announcement from an unauthorized source pre- 
cipitated something bearing a close resemblance to a Cabi- 
net crisis, and, so far as the schemes of the Confederate 
Commissioners and the French Emperor were concerned, fur- 
nished a fresh illustration of the truth of Robert Burns's 
familiar aphorism as respects the fate not seldom befalling 
even the best-laid plans. 

Tphe ministerial situation then existing needs here to be 
understood, and has constantly to be borne in mind. The 
Pabnerston-Russell Cabinet, so called, had been formed in 

* Maxwell, Clarendon, ii. 267. 



25 

June, 1859. The Premier, born in October, 1784, was then 
in his seventy-fifth year. Earl Russell, his colleague in the 
ministry and associate in its formation, was sixty-six. The 
House of Commons was very evenly divided. The previous 
government — that headed by Lord Derby, with Mr. Disraeli 
as its leader in the Commons — had, as the result of an appeal 
to the constituencies, been turned out of office by a majority 
of thirteen only on a division numbering 638 members. Under 
these circumstances the two leaders jointly responsible for 
the new government had sought to combine in the Cabinet 
representatives of all shades of Liberal principles. The result 
was a body of exceptional abihty, but composed of men by 
no means always concurrent in their opinions, or harmonious in 
action. Mr. Gladstone was Chancellor of the Exchequer; and 
that the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
were not in general harmony was well known in ministerial 
circles. On the contrary. Lord Palmerston disHked and ha- 
bitually thwarted Mr. Gladstone; and Mr. Gladstone instinc- 
tively distrusted Lord Palmerston. So far did this go that the 
two had, a year before the time in question, been ''in violent 
antagonism" on financial propositions. Lord Granville, him- 
self a member of the Cabinet, had informed a correspondent: 
*'For two months Gladstone had been on half-cock of resigna- 
tion. . . . Palmerston has tried him hard once or twice by 
speeches and Cabinet minutes, and says that the only way to 
deal with him is to bully him a little; and Palmerston appears 
to be in the right." To the same effect Bright had then written 
to Cobden: ''Gladstone has been in a painful and critical posi- 
tion ; from day to day it has been doubtful if he could remain 
under a leader who has used him so treacherously." This 
referred to the Premier's characteristic action in procuring the 
defeat in the Lords of Gladstone's bill repealing the Paper 
Duties. Then, the next year, the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
had countered on the Premier by incorporating this measure of 
repeal in the Budget, and so compelling its passage by the Lords. 
A species of Cabinet modus vivendi was then arrived at, and 
had since been more or less observed; but the two men were 
by nature antagonistic. Built on wholly different models, 
they were, to use the Italian expression, constitutionally an- 
tipatica. Palmerston was indisputably old; Gladstone, a man 



26 

of fifty-four, was in the full maturity of his great powers. 
His star was looming large in the Parliamentary heavens — 
distinctly in the ascendant. One competitor only, Sir George 
Cornewall Lewis, could challenge prospective leadership with 
him. 

Of Lewis something must here be said, for at a most critical 
juncture for us — that now under consideration — he was a 
vital political factor. A man of marked individuality and 
great force, Lewis temperamentally appealed to Palmerston. 
Though very differently constituted, the two men got on to- 
gether. Lewis had himself been Chancellor of the Exchequer 
in Palmerston's previous ministry (1856-1857), and had then 
won the confidence of the House of Commons. In the debate 
on the Budget he had introduced, he successfully withstood 
the combined attacks of both Gladstone and Disraeli. In fact, 
the rise of Lewis in parliamentary estimate had been as marked 
as it was rapid. Later, on the formation of the Palmers ton- 
Russell government, he had yielded precedence to Gladstone, 
who became Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lewis accepting the 
less considered positions, first of Home Secretary, and then 
(1861) of Secretary for War. He is described by Sir Spencer 
Walpole, who spoke with personal knowledge, as being without 
the imagination which attracts attention or the eloquence which 
commands it, but as having knowledge, ability and judgment. 
Thus his temperament, Walpole further adds, made him a 
power in the Cabinet; and, though it procured him Kttle or 
no notice in the country at large, won for him the respect of 
the Commons. In the House he was regarded as one of the 
few men who might possibly in the not remote future preside 
over the fortunes of the country.^ Palmerston, though still 
vigorous, must, it was obvious, soon pass from the stage. With 
him also were to go both a generation and a political system — 
the generation of Castlereagh, Wellington, Melbourne and 
Peel, and the system of ministerial government which had 
grown into acceptance through the working of the Reform Act 
of 1832 — a transition system based on a species of equilib- 
rium attempted between a reformed House of Commons on 
the one side and an hereditary Chamber of Peers on the other. 
This system had, with more or less success, served its pur- 

i Twenty-five Years, i. 74. 



27 

pose through the Ufe-time of a generation; but, in 1862, mani- 
festly antiquated, it no longer worked in reasonable harmony 
with existing conditions, social and industrial. It was, there- 
fore generally accepted that, with Palmerston gone, a drastic 
constitutional revision would be in order, and mevitable. 
The leadership would then go to younger men, and either to 
Gladstone or to Lewis; and Palmerston, it was well under- 
stood, favored the latter. So far as was in his power he 
designated Lewis as his residuary ministerial legatee. But 
this arrangement, if in any degree practicable, was made im- 
possible by the premature and altogether unexpected death 
of Lewis on April 13, 1863 - only six months after the occur- 
rence of the events now under consideration. It was prooa- 
bly then that Pahnerston, reading the future not mcorrectly, 
had been heard to say: "Gladstone will soon have it all his 
own way; and whenever he gets my place we shall have 
strange doings." ' Meanwhile in the closing months 01 862 
Lewis was still alive; and Palmerston, so to speak, held the 
fort. As between him and Gladstone, it was a case of armed 
Cabinet observation. _ , , -r, , 

Under these circumstances the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
had in the autumn gone on what proved to be a sort_ of 
triumphal political progress through the northern counties. 
Surprising even him by its manifestations, it amounted to a 
popular ovation; and, not unnaturally, his colleagues, espe- 
cially his chief, took cognizance of it. Suddenly in course 
of it, came the highly sensational and quite uncalled for utter- 
ance on the American situation, then the foremost topic m 
the pubUc mind. From his long-subsequent pubUshed diary 
entries, it appears that what Mr. Gladstone there said was no 
hasty, impromptu, dinner-table utterance; it had, on the con- 
trary, been, as he thought, carefully considered. The mference 
appears to be unavoidable. In taking such a course, and 
committing his colleagues as well as himself by his utterances 
Mr. Gladstone, as a member of the Government, spoke with 
a purpose; but that purpose was not distinctly apparent at the 
time, nor has the mystery since been satisfactorily explained 
A momentous utterance, Mr. Gladstone himself afterward 
referred to it as "an error the most singular and palpable. 

'Trevelyan, BrisM, 344. 



28 

Lord Morley in his Life (ii. 79), plainly puzzled, says that it 
was ''a great mistake ... of which [Gladstone] was destined 
never to hear the last." Thirty years later Gladstone him- 
self wrote — ^'This declaration [was] most unwarrantable 
to be made by a minister of the crown with no authority other 
than his own. . . . The fortunes of the South were at their 
zenith. Many who wished well to the Northern cause despaired 
of its success. The friends of the North in England were begin- 
ning to advise that it should give way, for the avoidance of 
further bloodshed and greater calamity. I weakly supposed 
that the time had come when respectful suggestions of this 
kind, founded on the necessity of the case, were required by a 
spirit of that friendship which, in so many contingencies of 
life, has to offer sound recommendations with a knowledge that 
they will not be popular." (11. 81.) 

I have heretofore, and recently at Oxford, thought to account 
for this Newcastle utterance upon an hypothesis which I 
am now satisfied is untenable. I reasoned as follows: Mr. 
Gladstone was famihar with the mental processes and pol- 
itical methods of his official chief. He was also deeply inter- 
ested after his own fashion in the proposed change of poHcy 
as respects the United States; hence it is not unfair to surmise 
that the Chancellor of the Exchequer suspected that, for reasons 
presently to be considered, the Premier's mind and purpose as 
respects the proposed change of poHcy were less clearly as- 
sured than had at first been the case, or than his colleague 
thought desirable. As matter of fact, considering the thing 
from a ministerial and parHamentary point of view, Palmer- 
ston had really begun to entertain grave doubts as to the tac- 
tical wisdom of the proposed move. Subsequently as. the result 
of much self-communing, Gladstone came to the conclusion 
that it would be well, if possible, to force the hand of his Chief, 
thus assuring the action which seemed under the circumstances, 
highly desirable. This ^'forcing-the-hand" historical hy- 
pothesis I now find myself compelled to abandon. While, so 
far as Palmerston and his subsequent action are concerned, 
inconsistent with the record since come to light, it does in- 
justice to Mr. Gladstone. My reasons for coming to this con- 
clusion I shall presently set forth; meanwhile, on the other 
hand, I was not without both plausible evidence and apparent 



29 

authority for reaching and stating the earlier conclusions just 
referred to. As an illustration of erroneous historical infer- 
ence the story will bear telling. 

Two writers, both men of judgment and enjoying access to 
the most reliable sources of information, had expressed them- 
selves on this head. Sir Spencer Walpole, the biographer of 
Earl Russell, says that Mr. Gladstone's Newcastle decla- 
ration "was so inconvenient" that ''Lord Palmerston sent 
for Sir George Cornewall Lewis, and told him that if he [Sir 
George] did not reply to Mr. Gladstone, it would be necessary 
for him [the Premier] to do so himself." ^ To the same effect 
but in language far stronger, Mr. Henry Adams wrote: ''Glad- 
stone, October 7, tried to force Palmerston's hand by treating 
the intervention as a fait accompli. Russell assented, but 
Palmerston put up Sir George Cornewall Lewis to contradict 
Gladstone and treated him sharply in the press. . . . Never 
in the history of pohtical turpitude had any brigand of modern 
civilisation offered a worse example [than that offered by 
Gladstone on this occasion]. The proof of it was that it out^^ y 
raged even Palmerston, who immediately put up Sir George^ 
Cornewall Lewis to repudiate the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
against whom he turned his press at the same time. Palm- 
erston had no notion of letting his hand be forced by 
Gladstone." ^ 

Relying on these authorities and drawing natural mferences 
and obvious conclusions from certain undisputed data, in my 
Oxford Lectures and elsewhere I attributed to the Cabinet 
situation just described a greater influence on the turn of 
events than correctly belonged to it. I said: "The hesitation 
and postponement brought about by Lord Pahnerston m 
consequence of Mr. Gladstone's Newcastle speech thus saved 
the [American] situation." Undoubtedly the Newcastle ut- 
terance, and its reception by other members of the ministry 
as well as by the Premier, did exercise an influence, and a 
not inconsiderable influence, on the policy subsequently de- 
cided upon and pursued; but more recent investigation in 
unpublished material, combined with new light from printed 
sources, clearly shows that this influence was not so altogether 

1 Twenty-five Years, 11. 57- 

2 Education of Henry Adatns, 136, 140. 



30 

controlling as I had inferred. It certainly did not operate in 
the way, nor altogether through the channels, my authorities 
had indicated. The Premier did at the time express himself 
decidedly, though with no indications of a rufHed temper, as 
to the Chancellor of the Exchequer's indiscreet and highly 
''inconvenient" utterances; but, on the other hand, it is not 
clear that he sent for Lewis, or imposed on him the function 
of a reply. In fact, it would appear he had no occasion so 
to do. Lewis was apparently quite ready to take action on 
his own part. It is to be borne in mind that it was now 
Autumn — the British vacation period. Parliament was not 
in session; the Queen was in Germany; the members of the 
Cabinet were scattered. Most of them were in the country, 
for the shooting season was on; some few of them only were at 
their offices. Lord Pahnerston was in the South of England, 
at Broadlands; Lewis was in Wales, at his country home. 

Our knowledge of what took place is thus derived chiefly 
from newspaper columns and such of the private letters then 
exchanged as have since chanced to appear in the numerous 
memoirs of the public characters concerned. It thence ap- 
pears that the proposed change of policy outlined in the me- 
morial of the Foreign Secretary of October 13 had been matter 
of serious consideration with certain members of the Cabinet; 
and this almost from the moment it had been agreed upon by 
the ''two ancient masters," as in famiHar correspondence Palm- 
erston and Russell were not over-respectfully designated 
by their associates. Palmerston, moreover, had especially re- 
quested Earl Russell to inform the Duke of Newcastle. The 
head of the Colonial Office, Newcastle, as such, was interested 
in a change of policy which obviously and deeply concerned 
Canada. Inasmuch as Lord Granville was now in attendance 
upon the Queen at Gotha, and her mental condition, though 
not openly discussed, was well understood, he also had to be 
advised; for, as Mason, the Confederate commissioner in 
London, about this time wrote to Mr. Hunter, the Confederate 
Secretary of State, "It is said that [the Queen] is under great 
constitutional depression and nervously sensitive to anything 
that looks like war." Much apprehension was in fact then 
felt lest she "lapse into insania." ^ There is at this stage of 

* Mason, Life of Mason, 264, 315. 



31 

developments no indication whatever, in the letters of Granville 
or in the other correspondence come to Hght, of any further 
exercise of influence by the Queen or of consideration paid her. 
Directly or indirectly, she nowhere appears as a factor in the 
situation. Granville, however, in reply to the intimation con- 
veyed him, wrote, under date of September 27, 1862, a detailed 
letter to the Foreign Secretary, in which he set forth the reasons 
why he considered it ^'premature to depart from the policy 
which has hitherto been adopted by you and Lord Palmerston, 
and which notwithstanding the strong antipathy to the North, 
the strong sympathy with the South, and the passionate wish 
to have cotton, has met with such general approval from Parlia- 
ment, the press and the public."^ Russell also now received a 
letter from Lewis, in which strong ground was taken against 
the change of policy proposed. These letters Russell, im- 
mediately on their receipt, forwarded to Palmerston, who wrote 
back, October 2, admitting that he had found in them much 
matter for serious consideration. It was at this date, there- 
fore, and in consequence of these letters, that doubts as to the 
expediency of the course agreed upon seem first to have entered 
into the mind of the Premier. 

It was still five days before Mr. Gladstone dehvered him- 
self at Newcastle. In view of the proposed demonstration 
there. Lord Palmerston had written (September 24) to Glad- 
stone, the letter already referred to, and from which extracts 
have been given. The next day, Thursday, September 25th, 
Gladstone replied by a missive marked ''Private," written 
from Hawarden Castle. In it he expressed himself as glad 
to hear what the Premier had told him, and further went on to 
say that he, for two reasons, desired prompt action on the 
Knes indicated. First, the rapid progress of the Confederate 
arms threatened, in his apprehension, to raise other very seri- 
ous difficulties. His chief reason, however, for desiring that 
there should be as little delay as possible in deciding upon the 
proposed change of policy was next given as follows: ''The 
population of Lancashire have borne their sufferings with a 
fortitude and patience exceeding all example, and almost all 
belief. But if in any one of the great towns, resignation should, 
even for a single day, give place to excitement, and an outbreak 

1 Fitzmaurice, Granville, i. 442. 



32 

should occur, our position in the face of America, and our in- 
fluence for good might be seriously affected; we might then 
seem to be interfering with less of dignity on the ground of our 
immediate interests, and rather in the attitude of parties 
than as representing the general interests of humanity and 
peace." ^ 

Up to this point, therefore (Thursday, September 25), 
the two men were in complete accord on the question under 
consideration. It was seven days later (October 2), and 
five days before the Newcastle speech (Tuesday, October 7) 
that the Premier, in consequence of the letters forwarded 
to him by Russell, began to waver in his conclusions. News 
oi the battle of Antietam had reached England on the 26th 

- of September, the day following Gladstone's acknowledg- 
ment of Palmerston's letter, in which acknowledgment allusion 
had also been made to the *' rapid progress of the Southern 
arms and the extension of the [American] area of Southern 
feeling." There is no indication of any further exchange of 
letters at this juncture, or that any intimation reached Glad- 
stone of the change of heart which Palmerston was expe- 
riencing. The methods and language of the Premier towards 
him both then and later were altogether courteous and con- 
ciHatory; and, so far from evincing any hard feeling because 
of the Newcastle indiscretion, as late as October 12 — five 
days after Gladstone had compromised himself and the Minis- 
try — Palmerston wrote from Broadlands to Russell in Lon- 
don as follows: "It is clear that Gladstone was not far wrong 
in pronouncing by anticipation the national independence of 
the South." 

The sensation following the Newcastle utterance was im- 
mediate and profound. Jefferson Davis, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer had declared, had made a nation; the independence 
of the Confederacy was as assured as was possible for a thing 
to be which was in a degree still future and contingent. All 
the world took it to mean that the government was about to 
recognize the Confederacy ; the market for cotton and for cotton 
. textiles was thrown into doubt, and uncertainty still further 

j disturbed a trade already in a condition of direst confusion. 
Orders were countermanded; the price of the raw material 
* Gladstone Papers, Ms. i. 73. 



33 

was seriously depressed. Moreover, large interests did not now 
want to have the war brought to a close, and made known 
their objection to any change of poHcy. Mr. McHenry in his 
^'Statement of Facts" says that he was ^'an eye-witness to this 
procedure," taking it upon himself-'to assure the Enghsh pubHc 
that, whatever change of poKcy might be agreed upon, the 
South was in no position to ''deluge" the European market 
with cotton. To the same effect, Mr. Mason, a local manu- 
facturing magnate, assured the Lancashire men that they 
had been needlessly terrified ''by that bugbear" of "American 
cotton at this moment shut up, while any mail might bring 
news in consequence of which four milKon bales would be let 
loose upon Manchester like a deluge." The speaker, however, 
at the same time took occasion pointedly to deprecate "the lan- 
guage which had been used by men in high position in this country 
with respect to the prospect of the duration of this war." 

Under such circumstances, Gladstone, realizing the false- 
ness of the position into which he had got himself, framed a 
form of reply, disclaiming responsibility for the various infer- 
ences drawn from his language; and this disclaimer, which, as 
Morley says, was couched "in phrases that justly provoked 
plain men to wrath," Gladstone sent to the Foreign Secretary, 
with a request that he would transmit it to his (Gladstone's) 
private secretary, to be made public use of by him as one 
acting under instructions. This Russell did, at the same time 
advising Gladstone that in the Foreign Secretary's opinion the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer had, in what he said at Newcastle, 
"gone beyond the latitude which all speakers must be allowed. 
Recognition," Russell added, "would seem to follow, and for 
that step I think the Cabinet is not prepared." ^ A similar 
disclaimer was sent by Gladstone to the Premier. This was 
prior to October 20. If anything further now passed between 
Palmerston and Gladstone, it has not come to light. But on 
the 20th Lord Palmerston did write to Lord Clarendon, who 
at this time acted as a sort of mutual friend or convenient 
pohtical intermediary, commenting adversely on Gladstone's 
utterances.^ This, however, he did without any indication of 
temper or of a serious taking of offence. 
The utterances of the press have next to be taken into con- 
* Morley, Life of Gladstone, n. 80. ^ Maxwell, Clarendon, 11. 267. 



34 

sideration, for two metropolitan papers at least — the Times 
and the Post — were looked upon as inspired.^ The Times, in 
its issue of October 9, referred editorially to the Newcastle 
speech, but commented upon it in no unfriendly tone. An 
explanation of Gladstone's language was found in ''the warmth 
of his feeling" and ''his readiness of speech." The following 
day it again referred to the speech, treating it as equivalent to 
a governmental decision. A strange silence then ensued, 
Delane, the editor, apparently sharing in the indecision of the 
Premier. This continued until November 13, when the paper 
came out with strong editorial approval of the Cabinet's re- 
jection of the mediation proposed. Meanwhile, the Post, 
currently supposed in well-informed London circles to be the 
more direct organ of the Premier, at the time of its delivery 
reported Gladstone's speech in full, but made no editorial 
comment upon it until October 13. It was then most comph- 
mentary to the Chancellor oT the Exchequer, speaking with 
laudation of the general results of his triumphal northern 
tour, but refraining from reference to American affairs. In 
pursuing this course, it seems to have reflected what was pass- 
ing in the Premier's mind; but at last, on the 21st, there ap- 
peared an editorial sharply criticising Gladstone as a minister 
altogether too ready to speak about Cabinet matters.^ The 
letter of the same date from Palmerston to Lord Clarendon 
would seem to indicate that this editorial was very directly 
inspired. The mind of the Premier was becoming clear as to 
the course now proper to be pursued; but, so far as Gladstone 
is concerned, there are no indications of resentment. 

Sir George Cornewall Lewis enters at this point upon the 

1 "It became tolerably clear to me [by October 13] that Mr. Gladstone had 
been expressing his individual opinions, and giving loose to his personal sym- 
pathy with the chief of the rebels, whilst his course was regarded by several of 
his colleagues as transcending the line of policy formerly agreed upon at the time 
of their dispersion for the summer. The first public indication of this took the 
shape of an informal notice in the Globe, an evening newspaper professing neu- 
trality in our struggle, and occasionally used for that reason to express ofi&cial 
opinions, which, not without a Uttle sharpness towards Mr. Gladstone, drew a 
clear line between him and the ministry in regard to the sentiments in his speech." 
Adams to Seward, October 17, 1862. Messages and Documents, 1862-63, Part I, 
221. 

2 The editorial reflected also on Lewis for his speech of October 4, though 
not in so severe terms. 



35 

stage, as the controlling Cabinet factor. What actuated 
Lewis does not clearly appear. Tn the language already 
quoted, Sir Spencer Walpole asserts that Palmerston sent 
for Sir George Cornewall Lewis, and told him that "if he [Sir 
George] did not reply to Mr. Gladstone, it would be necessary 
for him [the Premier] to do so himself." Lord Morley in his 
Life of Gladstone says that "a week after the dehverance at 
Newcastle, Lewis at Lord Palmerston's request, as I have 
heard, put things right in a speech at Hereford." The issue 
of the London Daily Telegraph of more than forty years after- 
wards — as late, in fact, as October 24, 1908 — contained a com- 
munication relating to what now occurred. Referring to 
Gladstone's Newcastle utterance, the writer, evidently well 
informed in a general way, speaks of it as 

a striking attempt by an individual minister to force the hand of 
the Cabinet by a public declaration. Four members — Sir George 
Lewis, Mr. Milner-Gibson, Sir George Grey, and Mr. Villiers — 
were vehemently opposed to any change in the policy of strict neu- 
trality. Lord Palmerston kept his own counsel, with a view of 
holding the Cabinet together, but was generally supposed to sym- 
pathise with the Southern States. The ill-considered language and 
conduct of Mr. Gladstone caused great indignation. ... A few 
days afterwards the four ministers to whom we have alluded [Sir 
George Lewis, Mr. Milner-Gibson, Sir George Grey, and Mr. Vil- 
liers] each received a note from Lord Palmerston, asking them to 
call and see him half an hour before the Cabinet Council, which had 
been specially convened. Two of these have described the interview 
to the writer of this letter. When they met. Lord Palmerston told 
them, to their astonishment, that he entirely agreed with them, and 
charged Sir George Cornewall Lewis then and there to go down to 
his constituents in the Radnor Boroughs and in the name of the 
Government practically repudiate the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
Lord Palmerston added that, if this were not done, he would an- 
nounce at the meeting of the Cabinet the resignation of the Govern- 
ment. Lewis consented. His measured and sober repudiation of 
Mr. Gladstone produced a great sensation. 

I do not vouch for the authenticity of this statement. Evi- 
dently written from recollection of occurrences and conversa- 
tions long passed, it is certainly inaccurate in many essential 
respects. None the less, it has significance as confirmatory 
of what is asserted or impHed by both Walpole and Morley. 



36 

It at least shows the general prevalence of a tradition and an 
historic understanding in quarters otherwise well informed. 
The intimate correspondence of Sir George Lewis with Lord 
Clarendon does not reveal any allusion to such a conference, 
or to any such mission imposed upon Lewis. On the contrary, 
judging by the letters in Maxwell's Life of Clarendon, and by 
those in other collections which I have been privileged to con- 
sult, it would be distinctly inferred that, so far as Sir George 
Lev/is was concerned, nothing of the sort described had ever 
taken place. Apparently, Lewis acted upon his own judgment 
and motion; and at a later day Lord Palmers ton unquestion- 
ably intimated in a letter to Clarendon that the Hereford 
speech was open in some degree to the criticism which had 
been expressed on Gladstone's utterance at Newcastle.^ 

Assuming, therefore, that Lewis now acted in the way he did 
upon his own initiative, the question next naturally arises — 
What led him so to do? Was he, as the expression then went, 
a ''friend of the North"? Did he sympathize with the anti- 
slavery feeling, and take action accordingly? Nothing ap- 
pears which would lead to an assumption that such was the 
case. On the contrary, as Morley -points out, Lewis in 1861 
used language of characteristic coolness about our Civil War. 
''It is," he wrote, "the most singular action for the restitution 
of conjugal rights that the world ever heard of." And again, 
"The Northern States have been drifted, or rather plunged, 
into v/ar without having any intelligible aim or policy. The 
South fight for independence; but what do the North fight for 
except to gratify passion or pride?" ^ Was he then actuated 
by an unworthy jealousy of a colleague, who had replaced him 
as Chancellor of the Exchequer? and did this feehng lead him 
to an outspoken hostile expression? This, however, was dis- 
tinctly not characteristic of the man. Lewis had Character. 
But he and Gladstone, though the latter also had Character, 
were not sympathetic. Lewis was an uncommonly level- 
headed man; of a judicial turn of mind; calm, clear and cou- 
rageous, he seems never to have hesitated to express himself, 
always, however, soberly and in a way indicative of thought. 
There could not consequently have been much close sympathy 
between him and Gladstone, a man influenced by fervor, and 

1 Clarendon, n. 267. 2 Morley, 11. 84 n. 



37 

subject to what can best be described as moments and even 
periods of cerebral exaltation. Gladstone's Newcastle utter- 
ances, though at the time, as he thought, well considered, 
were, there can be little question, largely attributable to im- 
pulse. He sympathized deeply and acutely with the Lanca- 
shire suffering. It appealed to him. He was also fully 
persuaded that the North was carrying on a hopeless struggle. 
He so expressed himself. Lewis, on the other hand, was 
otherwise-minded; but both his attitude and utterances at 
this juncture bear marks of conviction. They are those of a 
pubhc-spirited minister, weighing considerations calmly, with 
a view to action on grounds which would bear examination. It 
would seem as if he did not propose to have the government of 
which he was a member swayed by authority or unduly in- 
fluenced by a "phalanx" of colleagues, no matter how '^ formi- 
dable," or to what degree reinforced. Accordingly, whether 
induced so to do by the Premier or acting on his own initiative, 
he thus, on October 14, a week after Gladstone's speech at 
Newcastle, expressed himself at Hereford: 

Everybody who read the accounts in the newspapers of what was 
doing in America could see that although there was a war between 
these two contending Powers, it was a war which was as yet un- 
decided — a war which was waged on the part of the Northern 
States for the purpose of restoring the States to the condition of 
union they were in before the war began; and on the part of the 
Southern States a war to establish their independence. But the 
war must be admitted to be undecided. Under such circumstances, 
the time had not yet arrived when it could be asserted in accord- 
ance with the established doctrines of international law that the 
independence of the Southern States had been established.^ 

The matter did not end here. Only the day before Sir 
George Lewis expressed himself at Hereford, Earl Russell 
had circulated his "confidential memorandum." Three days> 
later, October 17, Sir George sent out a counter-memorandum 
in reply to that of Earl Russell. The memorandum, Kkewise 
confidentially addressed to his colleagues of the Cabinet, was 
elaborate. In it he expressed himself even more explicitly 
than at Hereford. This paper has as yet never seen the light. 
Though important in itself, especially to American writers, 

1 The London Post, October 16, 1862. 



38 

and illuminative as to conditions then prevailing in Great 
Britain, it is too long to be given here in full. It ends, how- 
ever, with the following expression: 

Every friend of humanity must wish that this disastrous and san- 
guinary war should be brought to a speedy termination. Every 
person who believes that it must terminate, sooner or later, in the 
independence of the Southern States, must desire to see that in- 
dependence recognized at an early period. Every person who 
sympathizes with the distress of the Lancashire operatives must 
wish that the ordinary trade in cotton with the Gulf States should 
be re-estabUshed. But, looking to the probable consequences of 
this philanthropic proposition, we may doubt whether the chances 
of evil do not preponderate over the chances of good, and whether 
it is not 

Better to endure the ills we have, 
Than fly to others that we know not of. 

Copies of both memoranda were sent to Lord Palmers ton, 
also to Lord Clarendon. From the former nothing, so far as 
is known, was eHcited. The comments of the latter were, 
however, truly edifying. He characterized the position of Earl 
Russell as "idiotic" — one in which he presented 

our face gratuitously to the Yankee slap we should receive. We 
have not yet recognized the Southern States (whose independ- 
ence is 2i fait accompli, whatever may be said to the contrary), be- 
cause it is not our interest to quarrel with the North; and we sub- 
mit to great privations, because it is our policy to remain neutral, 
and not because we doubt the utter inability of the North to impose 
its yoke again upon the South. The French, who have no such fears 
about a quarrel with the North, have long since thought that the 
time was come for recognizing the South, and they would have done 
so if they had not been restrained by deference to our wishes and 
interests. ^ 

In thus expressing himself. Clarendon did but echo the con- 
clusion then generally accepted by those recognized as leaders 
of both pohtical parties — those looking to Lord Derby for 
guidance and those led by Palmerston, The Saturday Review 
w^as a free journaHstic lance, with pronounced ''governing 
class" views. Referring to the Newcastle utterance, the Satur- 

^ Clarendon, n. 266. 



39 

day Review now voiced the prevailing belief of Court, Aris- 
tocracy, Army and Navy, no less than that of the Street as 
well as ParHament. *'We did not," it contemptuously and 
characteristically said, ''need a Cabinet Minister to tell us, 
what all who possess even the most elementary acquaintance 
with passing events in America have known for more than 
half a year, that the independence of the Southern States is 
an accompHshed fact, nor does it become one whit more an 
accompHshed fact by the circumstance of Mr. Gladstone's 
announcement. ' ' 

The English situation as it then existed not only as respects 
Sir George Lewis but also as respects Lord Palmer ston, the 
members of the Ministry and the members of the press, cannot, 
however, be fully understood without taking into account the 
letters signed ''Historicus," at this time appearing in the 
columns of the Times. "Historicus," as was already well 
known, was merely the newspaper nom de plume of Mr. 
WilHam Vernon Harcourt, subsequently distinguished in 
public life, but then a rising young man of thirty-five. Har- 
court's relations with Sir George Lewis were of the closest 
character, for in November, 1859, he had married Lewis's 
step-daughter, who was also Lord Clarendon's niece. A 
man of great ability, incisive style, and masterful disposition, 
young Harcourt was applying himself to problems of inter- 
national law. In common with every one else, deeply inter- 
ested in the international aspects of the American struggle he 
now contributed a series of letters to the London Times. 
These at the moment attracted much public attention, and 
upon them his subsequent reputation was based. He unques- 
tionably set forth in those letters the conclusions reached as 
a result of frequent and famiHar discussion with both Sir 
George Lewis and Lord Clarendon. Subsequently (1863) pub- 
lished in pamphlet form, in the preface to the publication 
Harcourt makes a reference to the "great events which are 
rending to pieces the entrails of America, and agitating to its 
inmost core the mind of Europe." In the first of these com- 
munications, referring to the Hereford speech, ''Historicus," 
speaking manifestly by authority, says: *'The position in- 
sisted upon by Sir G. C. Lewis seems to have been much 
misunderstood by those who have criticised his doctrine. He 



40 . 

is supposed to have maintained that England would not be 
entitled to recognize the Southern Confederacy until the 
Federalists had previously done so. But the Secretary of War 
is far too accurate a thinker and speaker to have laid down 
any such doctrine. The rule he propounded was precisely 
that acted upon by Mr. Canning in the case of the South 
American Republics, viz., that where a doubtful and bona 
fide struggle for supremacy is still maintained by the Sover- 
eign power, the insurgents jam flagrante hello cannot be said 
to have estabhshed a de facto independence." He then goes 
on as follows; setting forth in clear and forcible language the 
correct rule of international law: 

As far, then, as any practical rule can be deduced from historical 
examples it seems to be this — When a sovereign State, from ex- 
haustion or any other cause, has virtually and substantially aban- 
doned the struggle for supremacy it has no right to complain if a for- 
eign State treat the independence of its former subjects as de facto 
established; nor can it prolong its sovereignty by a mere paper 
assertion of right. When, on the other hand, the contest is not 
absolutely or permanently decided, a recognition of the inchoate 
independence of the insurgents by a foreign State is a hostile act 
towards the sovereign State which the latter is entitled to resent 
as a breach of neutrality and friendship. The true rule is that 
laid down in the old distich. Rebellion, until it has succeeded, is 
Treason; when it is successful, it becomes Independence. And thus 
the only real test of independence is final success. 

He concludes as follows : 

Yet if we are to mediate, it can only be by urging some plan 
which we approve. What is that solution of the negro question 
to which an English Government is prepared to aflSx the seal of 
English approbation? If the combatants settle the question for 
themselves, we can accept the result, whatever it may be, and 
however little we may approve it, without responsibility. If the 
matter is to be negotiated through our mediation, we must lend 
our moral sanction to the settlement at which we assist. There 
are many things which we cannot help, but there are some things 
with which it were wise to have nothing to do. And to this latter 
category I venture to think most eminently belongs the definition 
of that permanent line of demarcation which must, no doubt, one 
day separate the Slave from the Free States of America. 



41 

So far as sympathy was concerned, the feeling then enter- 
tained by Sir George Lewis and Lord Clarendon is probably 
not incorrectly mirrored in the following extract from a sub- 
sequent communication of ^'Historicus" to the Times: 

Is there any man so sanguine as to hope that the end of this busi- 
ness is to be the extinction of slavery? But, if not, are we. to be- 
come the virtual guarantors for its security? To my mind, in the 
one word "slavery" is comprehended a perpetual bar to the notion 
of English mediation as between the North and the South; a bar 
to amicable mediation, because it would be futile; to forcible inter- 
vention, because it would be immoral. Shallow and inexperienced 
observers may suppose that English opinion has undergone a revolu- 
tion on the subject of slavery. It is true that the English public 
has been revolted by the insincerity and hypocrisy of Northern 
politicians on this question. We have seen through the cant by 
which political capital has been manufactured out of a great cause; 
but, on the true merits of the question itself, I believe the con- 
victions of the English people to be wholly unchanged. It is my 
firm persuasion that there is no sentiment more deeply rooted in 
the conscience of the nation than the abhorrence of the principles 
and practice of that which is called in the South "the peculiar 
institution," but which in England we know by the more straight- 
forward name of "negro slavery." If we refuse to become the 
dupes of Northern insincerity, we are equally determined not to 
make ourselves the abettors of Southern iniquity. A joint media- 
tion, involving the settlement of this question, would practically 
place our honour in the hands of our copartners in the intervention. 
We might find ourselves placed in a position in which it would be 
equally difficult to advance with credit or retire with safety. Yet 
any administration, which should compromise the character of 
England in a cause for which she has encountered so many sacrifices, 
would make a fatal and inexcusable mistake. 

The foregoing extracts from the letters of ^'Historicus"^ 
probably set forth clearly and correctly the considerations which 

1 The letters of "Historicus" afford excellent reading even now, fifty years 
after their appearance in the columns of the Times. They foreshadow the sub- 
sequent parliamentary eminence of the writer. Throughout he evinces a mastery 
of his subject, an incisiveness of utterance, and a freedom in the expression of 
opinion distinctly refreshing. His comments, for instance, on what are known as 
the "standard authorities" on principles of international law, in no way lacking 
in clearness, will bear reproduction. 

Of Hautefeuille's treatise he says: "For contempt of the existing code of 



42 

actuated Sir George Lewis and others in regard to the struggle 
then going on in America. They looked upon it as useless and 
bloody, and considered the independence of the Confederacy 
an accomplished fact. Only a question of time, they saw no 
good reason for involving Great Britain in a conflict the out- 
come of which was apparent and any participation in which 
could result only in an indefinite war-expenditure, and inci- 
dental injury to British commerce and mercantile marine 
impossible of forecast or estimate. 

Returning now to the course of events in October and 
November, 1862, while, so far as is known, the Premier pre- 
served the discreet silence incident to a strict neutrahty in 

international law, for intrepidity in the misrepresentation of history, for audacity 
of paradox, this ingenious speculator is without his equal, even in the modern 
license of coxcombical jurisprudence. I can concede to M. Hautefeuille every- 
thing except the title to originality. ... I have no hesitation in saying that, of 
all treatises on this subject which have ever come under my notice, it is the most 
inaccurate and the most unreliable that is anywhere extant. I think I am not 
putting the case too high when I say that on any given point the presumption is 
that the propositions which will be found to be laid down by M. Hautefeuille are 
not only not the law, but are the exact reverse of the established law of nations." 

Of Philhmore he next writes: "The recent work of Dr. Phillimore is a useful 
compilation, in which, however, amidst the heterogeneous pile of indiscriminate 
and undigested material, in which the good, bad, and indifferent is garnered 
up with laborious impartiality, an inexperienced reader is not unlikely to lose 
his way. It is a digest of opinions and authorities, rather than a scientific 
disquisition, on the topics to which they refer. When I turned over the pages 
of Dr. Phillimore's book, I confess it was with the confident expectation of 
finding the unauthorized crotchet of M. Hautefeuille either scouted with the 
brief contempt of which Wheaton thought it worthy, or, at least, disposed of 
upon the clear authorities to some of which I have referred you. But what was 
my astonishment — I will add my regret — to find that, so far from condemning 
this monstrosity, Dr. Phillimore actually approves and adopts it!" 

Where a contributor to a newspaper deals with English and French authorities 
in this masterful manner, it is safe to assume that he would hardly evince much 
respect for the law enunciated by Secretary Seward. Such is the case. In another 
letter contributed to the Times "On the Affair of the Treftt," Mr. Vernon 
Harcourt, as he then was, expressed himself as follows: "Mr. Seward 'trusts 
that he has shown that the four persons who were taken from the Trent by 
Captain Wilkes and their despatches were contraband of war.' This confidence 
expressed by the American Secretary of State can only be founded on the as- 
sumption that all the persons to whom his argument is addressed enjoy the same 
ignorance of the elements of international law with which he himself rests so 
abundantly satisfied. . . . The great maritime nations of England and France 
cannot afford to have the leading principles of international law confounded 
by the loose inaccuracies of Mr. Seward. They cannot suffer their trade to be em- 
barrassed and their interests compromised by the American navy acting upon 
instructions of which every line is a blunder." 



43 

this conflict of Cabinet memoranda and Newcastle-Hereford 
clash of policies, his next step was characteristic — almost 
delightfully characteristic of the man and of the English 
political methods of the period. 

The Palmerston-Russell ministry held office by a somewhat 
uncertain tenure through the silent acquiescence of a large 
element in the ranks of the Conservatives, who recognized 
in the Prime Minister one of themselves. The head of the 
firm was accepted as a species of compromise; and it was 
tacitly understood that, exceptional conditions and issues be- 
ing allowed for, Palmerston would now remain in office as 
long as he Hved; Russell was a different proposition. The 
Premier appreciated the situation, and, holding further Par- 
liamentary reform in abeyance on the one hand, on the other 
he did not advocate a really aggressive foreign policy. As 
respects America, his sympathies were with the South; but, as 
to slavery, he was committed to the other side. The United 
States he looked upon as a species of present international 
nuisance and prospective danger; Democracy was an alto- 
gether evil thing. The nuisance, he wished to see abated; 
the evil thing was working out its natural results, so bringing 
itself into world-wide disrepute. And this it was doing, now! 
Lancashire was manifestly a temporary ill; the question of 
cotton supply would, if let alone, settle itself. So, wily in his 
ways, the Premier had recourse to the '' mutual friend"; he 
wrote to Clarendon to sound Derby. 

This Clarendon did, and the response was satisfactory.* 
Derby told Clarendon that he had been constantly urged *'to 
go in," as he expressed it, for mediation and recognition; but 
had refused so to do on the ground that any action would 
merely irritate the North without advancing the cause of the 
South, or procuring a single bale of cotton. Clarendon then 
added that Derby, without professing an opinion, said that 
*'the recognition of the South would be of no benefit to Eng- 
land unless we meant to sweep away the blockade, which 
would be an act of hostility towards the North." This 
"mutual-friend" illumination reached Palmerston some ten 
days after Gladstone had delivered himself of his Newcastle 
utterance, and nearly a week before the date assigned for the 
* Clarendon, ii. 267. 



44 

Cabinet meeting. Meanwhile, the news from America was of 
an uncertain nature, and, probably, for that reason disappoint- 
ing so far as Palmerston was concerned. He had hoped for a 
decisive Confederate success; but the reports indicated Lee's 
withdrawal again into Virginia. The Confederate aggressive 
movement had come to an end; its clutch at Washington had 
failed. Altogether, it was a highly mixed situation; and the 
Premier was more and more besieged by doubt. 

The members of the Cabinet were meanwhile reaching vari- 
ous individual conclusions. Indications were not lacking that 
the Foreign Secretary was annoyed both by Gladstone's pre- 
mature utterance on the one side, and by Lewis's attitude of 
aggressive opposition on the other. Yet the Hereford speech 
and the subsequent confidential ''memorandum" would, if any- 
thing, have seemed to confirm the Foreign Secretary in his 
advocacy of mediation. He was irritated at this pronounced 
inroad on his province.^ But all idea of recognition had been 
dismissed. What he seems now to have aimed at was simply 
an altogether non-committal tender of good offices — quite a 
different thing ! To this the original more aggressive program 
had been reduced. 

The remaining members of the Cabinet were influenced by 
various considerations. As representing Canada, the Duke 
of Newcastle, Colonial Secretary, advocated delay. With 
winter impending, he evidently felt no inchnation to renew 
the activities of the Trent excitement period of the previous 
year, including its movement of troops, suppKes, etc., to 
Canada. There was also an element in the Cabinet, consisting, 
as already mentioned, of the Duke of Argyll, Mr. Milner- 
Gibson, Sir George Grey, and Mr. Villiers, pronouncedly in 
sympathy with the national government, or ''the North," as 
the National and Union side to the struggle was always des- 
ignated. As already pointed out, Mr. Milner- Gibson, in close 
sympathy with the Bright-Cobden pohtical element, and, in 
fact, its representative in the Cabinet, not improbably consti- 
tuted a convenient medium of communication for Mr. Adams' 
friend, Mr. W. E. Forster, Thus, as time passed, the Premier 
became satisfied that the majority of those composing the 
Cabinet, on general principles inclined strongly to sympa- 
* Clarendon, n. 266. 



45 

thize with the South, were distinctly averse to any imme- 
diate change of poKcy. The perturbation of the cotton mar- 
ket, as respects both textiles and raw material has already 
been referred to; and now not without reason, the City was 
nervous. At just that time, the Alabama was playing havoc 
with the American commercial marine,^ incidentally illustrating 
for the benefit of Lloyd's the inconveniences in possible wars 
of modern commerce-destroyers. In the event of hostilities 
the boot might not impossibly be found transferred to the 
other leg; for, on the high seas, the Americans were apt 
pupils. So, while as a result of a changed policy, the blockade 
would assuredly be broken and cotton released, this might 
well be brought about at the risk of losses in comparison 
with which that resulting from a cotton shortage was not 
to be considered. Rather than incur it, would it not be 
better, because less costly, to board indefinitely all the unem- 
ployed of Lancashire in the most expensive hotels of Man- 
chester and Liverpool? And this view of the case Richard 
Cobden thus put with characteristic bluntness: "I will ven- 
ture to say, that it would be cheaper to keep all the popula- 
tion engaged in the cotton manufacture — ay, to keep them 
upon turtle, champagne, and venison — than to send to 
America to obtain cotton by force of arms. That would in- 
volve you in a war, and six months of that war would cost 
more money than would be required to maintain this popula- 
tion comfortably for ten years." ^ Nothing in any way ade-v 
quately compensating for the risks run by a change of policy 
was thus in sight. Moreover, so far as the ultimate issue of 
the American struggle was concerned, the concurrence of opin- 
ion was distinct that Gladstone had not overstated the case. 
The Premier, and both Clarendon and the French Emperor 
used respecting it the same expression — the independence of 
the Confederacy was '^un fait accompli.^^ It was merely a 
question of time, involving the effusion of a certain amount 
of blood, chiefly Irish and German, in addition to that of the 
same strains which had already been so profusely and, as most 
thought, so needlessly, and even wantonly spilled. After all, 
Gladstone had voiced it not incorrectly: "We know quite 

* Message and Documents, 1862-63, Part I. 206. 
2 Cobden, Speeches, n. 469. 



46 

well that the people of the Northern States have not yet 
drunk of the cup — they are still trying to hold it far from 
their lips — which all the rest of the world see they neverthe- 
less must drink of." ^ 

As it reached him day by day, this general do-nothing re- 
sponse on the part of the members of the Cabinet undoubtedly 
affected the mind and purpose of the Premier. Though quite 
ready to yield to the pressure in favor of mediation, and, later 
on, even of recognition, Palmerston no longer felt the confidence 
and buoyancy of his earHer years. Old, and conscious perhaps 
of being a bit weary, he in those October days of 1862 had 
cause to appreciate a ministerial situation concerning which he 
thus at a subsequent date and on another occasion wrote to 
Earl Russell: ''As to Cabinets, if we had colleagues Hke those 
who sat in Pitt's Cabinet, or such men as those who were with 
Peel, you and I might have our own way on most things; but 
when, as is now the case, able men fill every department, such 
men will have opinions and hold to them." ^ Lewis certainly 
now held such opinions, nor was evidence lacking that he 
proposed to ^' hold to them." Palmerston thus saw no sufficient 
reason for action. If it involved a ministerial break, the 
government was not strong enough to stand a break. And 
later Clarendon wrote Lewis: "Your speech at Hereford was 
nearly as effective in checking the alarm and speculation 
caused by Gladstone's speech, as your memorandum was in 
smashing the Foreign Secretary's proposed intervention."^ 

Though the Foreign Secretary must by this time have real- 
ized that in the Cabinet there was much opposition to his 

1 "The commissioners and the principal agents of the Confederate States in 
England had opportunities for learning the feelings of different members of the 
Government, and of prominent men in both of the great parties, with a very near 
approach to certainty. I shall not be guilty of the indiscretion of classifying the 
Cabinet by name, but I may say that it was a common belief among the repre- 
sentatives of the Confederate States that two members [Russell and Gladstone] 
of the Ministry, at least, were very favorable to the South, and that still another 
[Palmerston] would have been disposed to give some support to certain members 
of the House of Commons who wished to bring in a motion for the recognition 
of the Government at Richmond, if he had not been impressed with the belief 
that the separation of the States was final, and that it would be both unnecessary 
and impolitic for the Government to give undue offence or encouragement to 
either of the combatants." Bulloch, Secret Service, 11. 4. 

2 Ashley, n. 438. 

^ October 26. Maxwell, Clarendon, 11. 266. 



47 

proposed change of policy, however chastened, and that the 
Premier was wavering even as to that irreducible minimum, 
Russell went ahead on the path outKned in his memorandum. 
The call had gone out for the Cabinet to meet on the 23d. 
The proposition that it was the "duty of Europe to ask both 
parties, in the most friendly and conciKatory terms, to agree 
to a suspension of arms'* was to be considered. Lord Lyons 
was then in London, and had postponed his departure for 
Washington until after the proposed meeting. In constant 
communication both with Russell and with Palmerston, he 
no doubt freely expressed his views, always conservative, as 
to the course to be pursued; but, so far as he was concerned, 
no record of what then took place has been preserved, or, at 
least, as yet made pubUc. 

Mr. Adams, meanwhile, purposely delayed seeking an ex- 
planation. When at last, however, he did request an inter- 
view, Russell named for it the afternoon of October 23, the 
very day the morning of which was assigned for the momentous 
Cabinet meeting. The interview was interesting; to Mr. 
Adams intensely so. He referred to the Newcastle speech, and 
made no secret of the uneasiness it had caused him. In reply, 
Earl Russell vaguely stated that Mr. Gladstone's utterances 
had been much misunderstood; and he referred to subsequently 
written explanatory letters of his colleague, which, however, 
had in every way failed to explain. He added, in true diplo- 
matic parlance, that while it was not for him to disavow any- 
thing on the part of Mr. Gladstone, he had no idea that, in 
saying what Mr. Gladstone had said, there was a serious in- 
tention to justify any of the inferences, drawn therefrom 
as to a disposition in the government to adopt a new policy. 
This was in itself going very far; but Russell added, the in- 
tention of the Cabinet still was to adhere to the rule of 
perfect neutrahty, and to let the American struggle come 
to its natural end without the smallest attempt at inter- 
ference, direct or otherwise. He could not, however, say 
what circumstances might occur from month to month in 
the future. Mr. Adams then inquired,, somewhat categorically, \ 
whether he was to understand the Foreign Secretary as say- \ 
ing that no change of policy was now proposed. To this Earl 
Russell gave his assent. 



48 

It was all very curious ; for, only an hour or so had passed 
since Earl Russell had asked those composing a part of the Cab- 
inet to authorize a change of policy, and his colleagues, or those 
of them then present, had, under the lead of Sir George Corne- 
wall Lewis, evinced a distinct disinclination to accede to the 
suggestion. Lord Granville was absent; but the Duke of 
Newcastle and Sir George Grey had joined in support of the 
position taken by Lewis. No formal action was taken at this 
gathering/ Palmerston was at Broadlands, and his staying 
there was significant. The Premier absenting himself, no 
action could be taken. In the aimless, informal discussion 
Russell and Gladstone stood alone. No Cabinet was held,^ 
and consideration of the business for which those present had 
been specially summoned was postponed sine die! 

Morley afterwards, in his Gladstone, called attention to the 
fact that the Foreign Secretary did not, in his conversation 
with Mr. Adanis, after those at the meeting had dispersed, 
construe strict neutrality or continuance of the existing policy 
as excluding what diplomatists call "good offices." It was 
a nice distinction, and widely at variance with the program 
originally arranged by the two "ancient masters"; but it 
served to meet present exigencies. So Mr. Adams contented 
himself with an expression of great rehef that Lord Lyons 
was to return to America, to which was added a hope that 
he would long continue there. To this the Foreign Secretary 
seems to have yielded a silent assent. Meanwhile, as Russell 
perfectly well knew, the question of abstention from in- 
terference of any character was not settled on that October 
23. And, only the day following, Gladstone circulated a re- 
joinder to Lewis, insisting again on the duty of England, 
France and Russia to intervene by representing "with moral 
authority and force the opinion of the civilized world upon 
the conditions of the case." ^ At the same time Russell trans- 
mitted to the Premier at Broadlands a communication marked 
"Confidential" in which, referring to the memorandum of 
Sir George Lewis, of the 17th, he said: "The basis of any 
negotiation for peace is a matter to be seriously considered 
by the European governments. Whenever the question is 

1 Maxwell, Clarendon, n. 265. ^ Maxwell, 11, 265. 

^ Gladstone Papers, i. 113. 



49 

considered by the Cabinet I shall be prepared to state my views 
upon that head." ^ Nothing, therefore, was as yet concluded. 
A few days later, indeed, on the 7th of November, Sir George 
Lewis submitted a final and most elaborate paper, which, 
marked ''Confidential," was printed for the use of the Cabinet. 
In it both the principles and the precedents involved were 
discussed in detail. A combination of brief and treatise, it 
is suggestive as to authorship. My own impression is that, 
prepared by Harcourt, it was presented as a Cabinet memo- 
randum by Lewis — of course in his own name!^ 

Though the attitude of the Emperor was well understood, 
the situation was complicated by his Mexican enterprise. 
From this the Enghsh had withdrawn. The bearing upon 
it of the American conflict was, however, obvious; and, natu- 
rally, the British government felt no disposition to be made 
use of in furtherance of Napoleon's Latin-American projects. 
Up to this time, therefore, the Slidell program was in abey- 
ance; his inducements to action had not materiahsed, and, 
moreover, the Emperor had evinced a distinct reluctance 
when further action had been suggested. He did not care 
to subject himself to a chance of further rebuff.^ Accordingly 
the English ministry had received no official offer or comrauni- 
cation from France upon this question; but the attitude of 
the Emperor was understood. Now, October 28, the Emperor 
gladdened Mr. SHdell's heart by advising him of the desire 
he felt to bring about, with England's aid, an American ar-. 
mistice, and of the active steps he was about to take to that 
end. He proposed to communicate on the subject with vari- 
ous European powers, including Great Britain. In view of 
advices from America, the hour seemed at last to have surely 
come.^ His message looking to such action was, however, not 
officially presented to Russell until November 10, though he 
had known the general character of the proposed measure 
from Cowley's letter of October 31. The following day, No- 

1 Morley, Gladstone, 11. 84. ^ Gladstone Papers, 11. 2-69. 

3 Walpole, n. 55. 

4 Slidell to Mason, October 29, 1862. For Slidell's report to Benjamin of 
his interview with Napoleon on October 28, see Richardson, 11. 345. Rhodes 
(iv. 346) gives the date incorrectly as October 22, deriving it from Bigelow, 
France and the Confederate Navy, 126. The error has been a source of con- 
fusion to historical writers. 



50 

vember ii, the question of mediation was again submitted by 
the Foreign Secretary to the Cabinet, formally convened. 

This meeting the Premier attended. It so chanced that 
both Gladstone and Lewis have left reports of what occurred. 
Gladstone wrote: "I am afraid we shall do httle or nothing in 
the business of America. Both Lord Palmerston and Russell 
are right. ^^ Of what occurred at an adjourned meeting held 
the next day, he reported: "The United States affair is ended, 
and not well. Lord Russell rather turned tail. He gave way 
without resolutely fighting out his battle. Palmerston gave 
to Russell's proposal a feeble and half-hearted support. . . . 
However, though we decline for the moment, the answer [to 
the French Emperor] is put upon grounds and in terms which 
leave the matter very open for the future." ^ Lewis's report is 
more specific. Addressed to Clarendon, it was given in a letter 
of the same date as the adjourned Cabinet meeting. He told 
how the Foreign Secretary had opened the meeting by stat- 
ing that the French Ambassador had called on him the pre- 
vious day and had read him a despatch from his government, 
proposing that Russia and England should join with France 
in a request to the two American belKgerents to suspend hos- 
tilities for six months, both by sea and land. No terms of 
pacification were suggested, and no offer of mediation made. 
Russia, it appeared, had dechned to be a party to this proposed 
joint representation, but was prepared to support it through 
her Minister at Washington, provided so doing would not 
cause irritation. For reasons which he then proceeded to 
give, the Foreign Secretary advised that the proposal of France 
should be accepted. Lewis thus goes on: 

Palmerston followed Lord John, and supported him, but did not 
say a great deal. His principal argument was the necessity for 
showing sympathy with Lancashire, and of not throwing away any 
chance of mitigating [the condition of affairs there existing.] 

The proposal was now thrown before the Cabinet, who proceeded 
to pick it to pieces. Everybody present threw a stone at it of greater 
or less size, except Gladstone, who supported it, and the Chancellor 
[Westbury] and Cardwell, who expressed no opinion. The principal 
objection was that the proposed armistice of six months by sea and 
land, involving a suspension of the commercial blockade, was so 

1 Morley, Gladstone , ii. 85. 



51 

grossly unequal — so decidedly in favour of the South, that there 
was no chance of the North agreeing to it. After a time, Palmer- 
ston saw that the general feeling of the Cabinet was against being 
a party to the representation, and he capitulated. I do not think 
his support was very sincere: it certainly was not hearty. . . . 
After the Cabinet had come to a decision, and the outline of a draft 
had been discussed, the Chancellor uttered a few oracular sentences 
on the danger of refusing the French invitation, and gave a strong 
support to Lord John.^ 

^'I think," Lewis significantly added in closing his letter, the 
Foreign Secretary's ''principal motive was a fear of displeasing 
France, and that Palmerston's principal motive was a wish to 
seem to support him. There is a useful article in to-day's Times 
throwing cold water on the invitation. I take for granted that 
Delane was informed of the result of the Cabinet." Unques- 
tionably, Delane had been informed; but, not without reason, 
did Slidell, on hearing of what had taken place, write to Mason: 
''Who would have believed that Earl Russell would have 
been the only mem'ber of the Cabinet besides Gladstone in 
favor of accepting the Emperor's proposition? " ^ 

Thus as respects the Slidell program '' the game was up," 
temporarily at least, and it was necessary " to take another 
tack." Acting as a government, the British Ministry had 
evinced a decided indisposition towards any change of policy 
involving a possible concurrence in the promotion and for- 
warding of the Emperor's Mexican venture. This also in 
direct disregard of the expressed recommendation of Premier, 
Foreign Secretary and Chancellor of the Exchequer. Of these 
three the veteran and altogether wily Premier at the moment 
probably looked upon the Cabinet action thus taken with 
entire complacency; in fact, had, to a large extent, engineered 
it. The officious and agressive Chancellor of the Exchequer 
had been forced to submit to a distinct rebuff. His position 
was in truth humiliating. Generally recognized as being so, 
it was so recognized by no one so much as himself. This was 
to Palmerston undoubtedly an outcome of the comphcation 
not otherwise than gratifying. Meanwhile, he, in all probabil- 
ity, Hke Gladstone, regarded the proposed action as merely 

1 Maxwell, Clarendon, n. 268. 

2 Slidell to Mason, November 28, 1862. 



52 

deferred — probably for a fortnight, perhaps for a month. 
But whether the postponement was for a greater or less period, 
the end he regarded as inevitable. The independence of the 
Confederacy was assured; the American Union was severed; 
or, as Lord Derby put it a Httle later on, "The restoration 
of the Union, as it formerly existed, is the one conclusion which 
is absolutely impossible." Thus, hugging themselves in this 
conviction of the sure occurrence of what they all most mshed 
to see, they awaited the speedy arrival of the inevitable. Palm- 
ers ton was outspoken in his belief. "As to the American 
War,'' he now characteristically wrote to Clarendon, "it has 
manifestly ceased to have any attainable object as far as the 
Northerns are concerned, except to get rid of some more thou- 
sand troublesome Irish and Germans. ... It must be owned, 
however, that the Anglo-Saxon race on both sides have shown 
courage and endurance highly honorable to their stock." 

The same belief obtained in France. The Emperor did not 
hesitate to express his firm conviction that the independence 
of the South was "ww fait accompli.''^ He would have liked 
to shape his course accordingly. Up to this time, however, 
his action had been hampered by compKcations in Italy. 
Since the Summer of 1 861-1862, Napoleon III had been anx- 
ious to withdraw the French garrison from Rome. He hesi- 
tated, however, in so doing because of his fear of losing the 
support of the clerical party in France. Count Cavour had 
died June 6, 1861. As a consequence thereof, a year later the 
Italian compKcations had become serious. The integrity of 
the Papal States was threatened. Rome, and Rome only, 
was to be the capital of a United Italy. Napoleon sought to 
arbitrate between the Pope and Victor Emmanuel. Suddenly, 
in July, Garibaldi had left Sicily with a body of revolutionary 
volunteers and openly marched on Rome. The Italian Gov- 
ernment interfered to stop him, and the affair of Aspromonte 
occurred, August 27. In it Garibaldi was wounded and cap- 
tured. So far as the Confederacy was concerned, to such a 
degree did these events complicate the situation that Slidell 
wrote to Mason, August 6: "Garibaldi's recent movements 
in Italy are exciting a good deal of alarm here and may I 
fear do us harm. I wish that he may be taken at sea and 
sent to New York." On the 20th of the samie month he again 



53 

wrote, "The affairs of Italy are giving great uneasiness and 
with all the Emperor's desire to get rid of his English com- 
mitments he can do nothing until Garibaldi is disposed of." 
Finally, October 17, Slidell wrote, referring to the change 
of Ministry which had arisen out of these complications. 
"There has been the devil to pay here about the Roman ques- 
tion and for the time our question has been lost sight of." 
On this issue a change of French Ministry now took place, 
Drouyn de Lhuys succeeding M. Thouvenel in the Foreign 
Office. SHdell presently undertook to resume the negotiations 
initiated wit^ M. Thouvenel, but found his successor wholly 
uninformed as to what had taken place. 

Meanwhile, the second Mexican expedition ha\dng now 
started to its destination, and the Italian compHcations being 
temporarily, at least, adjusted, the Emperor, in view of what 
had occurred in London at the meeting in Downing Street 
on the 23d of October, submitted the proposition for joint 
action simultaneously to the Foreign Offices of St. Petersburg 
and London. Into its reception by the Russian Foreign Office, 
and the attitude there assumed in regard to it there is no occa- 
sion here to enter. The comment of the English Minister at 
St. Petersburg will suffice. He wrote: "I think that the 
proposal of M. Drouyn de Lhuys is very repugnant to the 
Prince [Gortchakoff] and that he would be happy to elude and 
defeat it in any way which would put the Russian Government 
in a favorable light before the Northern Federation." Such 
being the case, and the suggestion of a joint offer of mediation 
being declined by Russia, the only question now in any doubt 
was whether the Emperor, in view of his expanded Mexican 
enterprise, could be induced to proceed independently. As 
respects Great Britain Mr. Slidell felt no confidence. He had 
diagnosed the situation there not incorrectly. Nevertheless, 
he had to await the action of the Ministry on Napoleon's 
formal suggestion. This was presented with the result which 
has been described. 

Such on November 11, 1862, was the situation of affairs 
in Europe as respects some form of interference in the Ameri- 
can conffict, whether through intervention, recognition, 
an offer of mediation, or simply a proffer of friendly offices 
looking to a temporary cessation of hostilities. No action 



54 

could be agreed upon. Meanwhile at that very time (Novem- 
ber 5), exactly seven weeks after the battle of Antietam, Mc- 
Clellan had been removed from the command of the Army of the 
Potomac. No one of recognized capacity or who commanded 
confidence whether at home or abroad had been found to re- 
place him. Under these circumstances, not unjustifiably 
pinning their faith on the vigorous lead of Lee and " Stonewall'' 
Jackson, Palmerston and Louis Napoleon, as well as Messrs. 
Mason and Slidell waited for something speedily to happen; 
and within the period commonly assigned therefor, something 
did happen ! — but not what either Palmerston or the French 
Emperor had anticipated. At that critical juncture, and by the 
merest chance as to time, one of the great events of the nine- 
teenth century took place in America. On September 22, 
while the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary were 
corresponding with a view to the early recognition of the slave- 
holding Confederacy, the coming Emancipation Proclamation 
of President Lincoln had been announced. That African ser- 
vitude was an issue in the American struggle was no longer 
possible of denial; and it presently became apparent that the 
newly assumed attitude of the national administration could 
not be ignored. The success of the Union cause from that 
time meant the freedom of the slave. 



lUM mi.JI -^A 



w " A 



